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PREFACE 
Few events in recent American History have elicited as much 
emotionalism and controversy as the fall of South Vietnam. Although 
American troops had not fought in the country since 1973, Americans in 
the spring of 1975 were acutely sensitive to the rapidly declining 
military situation and the plight of thousands of Vietnamese refugees. 
In March and April, efforts by President Gerald R. Ford to secure 
emergency military aid for the Saigon government created a furor among 
politicians and the public. Polls showed that a majority of Americans 
felt further military aid to Saigon would only prolong the suffering of 
millions of indifferent Vietnamese who did not care if they lived under 
communism. Following the fall of Saigon on 29 April, the President's 
decision to resettle thousands of "high risk" and other Vietnamese 
throughout the nation again caused many Americans to react in a way 
which the President said did not seem appropriate for a nation of refugees. 
Although difficult to discern because of their closeness, historians 
cannot overlook nor avoid the events of 1975. Basically, it can be 
generalized that political factors and public opinion played important 
roles in the aid, evacuation and refugee issues. Public opinion greatly 
limited the options of the President, State Department, Defense Department 
and the Congress in foreign policy making, in evacuation planning, in the 
debate over military aid to Saigon and in planning for the refugee 
resettlement program. 
The writing of this "instant history" encountered numerous 
obstacles. In many cases, primary sources were not available and many 
iii 
sources that were used obviously were not the most reliable. 
With these limitations in mind, this writer hopes to have illustrated 
how public opinion to a degree influenced the policy making process 
of the American government by placing constraints upon the complex 
political system. 
Many individuals have helped me in the preparation of this paper. 
Foremost are Dr. Robert David Ward, my major professor, who offered 
scholarly advice and criticism, and Captain David Firster, an Army 
intelligence officer, who offered much needed analysis of the military 
situation in South Vietnam. Dr. Howard C. Thomas, Jr., a State 
Department official who served from 1966 to 3975 in South Vietnam, 
also provided invaluable insight. And, Professors Clement Charlton 
Mosely and J. Perry Cochran deserve appreciation for serving on my 
reading committee and for the criticism they provided. 
Edwin Donald Miller 
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CHAPTER I 
THE VIETNAM DILEMMA 
Will some future poet write (of) 'the click heard round the 
world?' That click would be the sound made by some rifle 
hammer striking an empty chamber the day that the last round of 
ammunition had been spent by those fighting for their freedom 
in Southeast Asia.—General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.^ 
The rapidly declining military situation in Vietnam and Cambodia 
of April 1975 came at a turbulent time in American history. Faced with 
double-digit inflation and an unemployment rate fluctuating between six 
and nine percent, Americans for the most part reacted suspiciously, if 
not bitterly, to attempts by President Gerald R. Ford to convince the 
Congress to appropriate emergency military aid to America's Southeast 
Asian friends who were struggling for their survival. Americans felt 
that further military aid from the United States to the two hopelessly 
corrupt dictatorships would only prolong the suffering of millions of 
indifferent Vietnamese and Cambodians who did not care whether they lived 
under communism. Moreover, the nation appeared war weary--tired of a 
10-year war that still had no end in sight, had cost 55,000 American 
lives, $150 billion and had led the nation to the worst economic slowdown 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
Public opinion clearly did not support the President's seemingly 
incessant requests for military aid. A Louis Harris poll conducted in 
the last week of March, a week when South Vietnam's President Nguyen 
Van Thieu attempted to consolidate his military forces, showed that 68 
Newsweek, March 31 , 1975, p. 16. 
2 
per cent of Americans opposed additional military aid for Cambodia and 
2 
even more, 74 per cent, opposed further aid to South Vietnam. 
On 28 April Time magazine correspondents reporting on the "mood" 
of the nation expressed this anti-war sentiment of most Americans. James 
Bell relayed feelings from the South: 
This region, where Presidents from Eisenhower through 
Nixon received their strongest and most lasting support 
for the war in Vietnam, has had it. As far as the South 
goes, the long and painful episode ended with the return 
of the last American prisoner of war. So Southerners 
generally say no to further military aid for Vietnam or 
the involvement of the U.S. Army, Air Force or Navy. 
They are, of course, for the evacuation of Americans 
but are nervous about the deployment of large numbers of 
Vietnamese.^ 
And, Benjamin W. Gate reported on Midwestern views: "Even the 
President's hometown paper, the Grand Rapids Press, accused Ford of 
'perpetuating the frauds (of the past.)'"^ 
And, from the West, Time's Jess Cook reported similar views: 
This side of the Rockies, most people make it clear 
that they have heard it all, viewed it all and read 
it all before... There is little enthusiasm for giving 
even humanitarian aid."* 
For the Congress, the decline of Vietnam came during an era 
when it was attempting to reassert its power over the Executive branch. 
Perhaps rejections of President Ford's requests for emergency military 
aid to Saigon signified defiance, rather than moral conviction, to the 
Executive who, Congress believed, had used the Vietnam War to usurp 
Thid. 
3Time, April 28, 1975, p. 12. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
3 
congressional responsibilities. However, reports concerning the sad 
state of affairs in Saigon—the corruption at high levels and the 
abandonment of one billion dollars worth of United States supplied 
military equipment by fleeing South Vietnamese troops—greatly distressed 
the Congress which wanted to end this long national nightmare. Never¬ 
theless, in the face of such obvious adverse public and congressional 
feelings, both President and State Department appeared to continue to 
push Congress for military aid so the Indochina war could be continued. 
Debate Over Military Aid 
In December 1974 Communist forces consisting of both North 
Vietnamese Regular and Provisional Revolutionary Government troops 
launched a relative weak, but psychologically effective, offensive in 
South Vietnam. The offensive did not surprise many who felt that 
Congress in 1973 had shirked America's responsibilities as guarantor 
of the Paris Peace Accord by passing legislation which prohibited the 
President from using American military forces to retaliate against 
Communist forces that disregarded the Accord. Now, a year and a half 
after enactment of the legislation, North Vietnamese forces were able 
to move large numbers of troops into the South and launch an offensive 
without worrying about American intervention. As Communists pushed 
southward, Thieu's military advisors made a tragic blunder by over¬ 
estimating the enemy's strength while underestimating the abilities of 
South Vietnamese military forces to stop the insurgents.^ As a result, 
^Interview with Dr. Howard S. Thomas, State Department, by 
E.D. Miller at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa., December 20, 1975. (Hereinafter 
cited as Thomas interview.) 
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Thieu's advisors on 15 January urged him to abandon the high plateau 
area of the country—nearly one half—and to consolidate his disinte¬ 
grating forces. 
Thieu waited until 10 March when Communist forces launched an 
unexpected attach on Ban Me Thout in the central highlands before 
undertaking the ill-timed and unplanned withdrawal. The President, in 
the face of this first major Communist attack, ordered his forces to 
move southward in defense of Saigon and the Mekong Delta which contained 
the bulk of South Vietnamese, the economy and rice land. However, the 
hastily executed move caused panic among smaller South Vietnamese 
military units whose commanders perceived the withdrawal as a rout 
caused by overwhelming Communist forces.'' 
The climax of the debacle came around 31 March with the fall 
of Da Nang. In an attempt to keep thousands of Vietnamese out of 
Communist hands, the United States decided to stage a massive evacuation. 
The evacuation, the largest ever planned, called for a massive movement 
by air and sea of some 500,000 Vietnamese to Phu Loc and the port 
cities of Cam Ranh Bay and Vung Tao. Thieu planned to use his troops 
to hold back Communist advances at the ancient imperial capital of Hue 
while South Vietnamese and Americans undertook the difficult evacuation. 
The premature withdrawal of the Army's elite airborne division 
and marine units from the Hue area caused confusion and troop morale to 
O 
sag. Instead of withdrawing his disorganized units first, Thieu 
decided to leave them in contact and instead pull back his best forces 
^ Jacksonville Journal, May 3, 1975. 
® Thomas interview. 
5 
to protect Saigon and himself from possible coups. In hopes of rallying 
his troops, Thieu told them that the battle would be the most decisive 
in Vietnamese history. His troops felt differently. Within hours after 
the evacuation began, Thieu's troops began to abandon their weapons and 
defensive positions. The evacuation turned into a tactical nightmare 
as mobs of troops and civilians descended upon the evacuation planes 
and ships. 
The resulting confusion allowed amazed North Vietnamese leaders 
to move all but two or three of their divisions—numbering about 20— 
from the north into the void created by the disintegrating Army of South 
Vietnam.^ As Thieu's units continued to needlessly and prematurely 
crumble, often without Communist pressure, the South Vietnamese president 
was unable to stabilize the declining military situation because he failed 
to tell his generals explicitly what his strategy involved. Orders from 
Thieu to the field changed by the hour. First he told his commanders 
to withdraw; then to defend in position; then to attack the Communist 
forces. 
President Ford, in the wake of these setbacks, proposed to 
Congress an amergency military aid bill consisting of $722 million, 
hoping that Saigon, with additional military aid, could stop Communist 
advances. During the week of 23 March, and despite an intensified 
Easter offensive launched by the Communists, Congress ignored the 
President's plan to resupply Thieu's forces and instead passed a $3.7 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid. 
6 
billion foreign aid bill that reduced Ford's request for aid to 
Indochina by $449.8 million. Both houses then adjourned for two weeks 
without voting on the emergency aid. 
With Da Nang lost, the President warned the Congress during a 
joint session on 14 April that the United States could not abandon its 
friends while American adversaries supported and encouraged theirs. 
He further said: 
The chances for an enduring peace after the last American 
fighting man left Vietnam in 1973 rested on two publicly 
stated premises: First, that if necessary, the United 
States would help sustain the terms of the Paris Accord 
it signed two years ago; and the second, that the United 
States would provide adequate economic and military 
assistance to South Vietnam.H 
The President explained that North Vietnam had violated the Paris 
Accord by introducing more than 350,000 troops, virtually its entire 
army, into the South while the United States reduced economic and 
military aid to South Vietnam. Ford considered this the coup de grace 
because, with this move, the United States had signalled its increasing 
reluctance to give any support to South Vietnam which was struggling 
for its survival. 
The President again urged Congress to grant his $722-million 
request for emergency military assistance and additional humanitarian 
aid to help ease the suffering of the people of Vietnam. He also 
-^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , H2683. In 1974, 
the Congress cut the Administration's aid request to Saigon from $1.4 
billion to $700 million. 
7 
called for Hanoi to honor the 1973 Paris agreement and asked the 
signatories, including China and the U.S.S.R., to use their influence 
with North Vietnam to bring about a halt to the fighting. The Congress, 
however, ignored the President's plea. Ford probably knew the Congress 
would refuse to grant his emergency military aid request. In January, 
he had first requested $300 million in emergency military aid for 
South Vietnam and the Congress refused. Faced with the refusal, Ford 
and his aides argued before congressional committees and in speeches 
that South Vietnam needed the aid to "stabilize" the military situation 
long enough to permit a negotiated peace and allow for the safe 
evacuation of Americans. Ford told newsmen attending a meeting of the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors on 17 April, "I am absolutely 
convinced if Congress made available $722 million in military assistance 
in a few days the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation 
1 ? in South Vietnam today." 
Faced with consistent congressional refusals in March and early 
April, the President realized he had no funds for emergency military 
aid except a $200-million contingency fund proposed by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. The panel told Ford he could use half of 
the amount for humanitarian aid to Cambodia and South Vietnam and the 
other half for evacuating Americans from South Vietnam. Meanwhile, 
the House International Relations Committee proposed a similar $327- 
million fund. The proposals irritated the President who aides said 
i 9 
Jacksonville Journal, April 17, 1975. 
8 
claimed that no funds would be better than the trifling amount authorized 
1 1 by the committees. J
The Congress during the two months of debate over the aid proposals 
firmly stood its ground. Representative Thomas J. Downey, New York, 
exemplified the anti-war sentiment which prevailed in the Congress. 
Testifying before the House Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations which 
was considering the President's request, he asked: "My God. Why are 
we still there? Why are we still financing the almost inconceivable 
suffering that the people of Vietnam have endured?" Continuing, he told 
the subcommittee: 
Almost a third of the Vietnamese population are refugees. 
In the years of fighting 860,000 'enemy,' 165,000 ARVN 
and 300,000 civilians (have been) killed. Proportionately 
it is as though 20 million Americans died in the war 
instead of 55,000.-'-^ 
In the Senate, Mark Hatfield, Oregon, also exemplified the 
anti-aid sentiment. He told his colleagues on 10 April: 
The ugly agony of Indochina is made all the more 
torturous by the delusive refusal of this nation to 
accept the culpability for decades of a morally inde¬ 
fensible policy whose final failure is now being revealed.^ 
Later the same day, Representative Robert L. Leggett, California, 
echoed the Senate reaction. Speaking to his colleagues, he branded 
Ford's request for additional military aid to Saigon as "absurd" and 
Florida Times-Union, April 16, 1975. 
-^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , E1432. 
-^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5637. 
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said that in the past year the United States had given Saigon two and 
one-half times as much aid as North Vietnam had received from the Soviet 
Union and China combined. Citing Pentagon figures, he said American 
military aid to South Vietnam during fiscal year 1975 totalled $1 billion. 
Further citing his objections to Ford's proposal, he said; "We have been 
engaged in a program of military aid to North Vietnam, giving them free 
major pieces of military equipment that have never been fired and only 
dropped once."^ 
Even Republicans in the Congress, although generally not agitating 
against Ford, conspicuously avoided comment on the President's request 
for emergency aid. General William C. Westmoreland, commander of 
American forces in Vietnam from 1965 through 1968, emerged as one of 
the few politicians to voice disgust with the Congress. He told an 
interviewer from the New York Times: 
For the life of me, I can't understand why the people of 
the United States are not incensed about Congress and 
the mockery Hanoi has made of the Paris Peace Accord, 
why we Americans don't see our moral obligation. 
By 21 April, poor strategic planning and leadership in Saigon, 
combined with the refusal of the United States Congress to grant 
emergency military aid, had caused the situation in South Vietnam to 
reach the crisis stage. The resignation of Thieu that day signified 
that the end would come shortly. 
^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5637. 
"^New York Times, March 28, 1975. 
10 
As Communist troops moved near Saigon in preparation for massive 
attacks on the capital city, the American Congress sat back and silently 
awaited the fall of South Vietnam. The issue by now had developed into 
a political "hot potato." The Congress wanted to avoid the issue as 
much as the President intended to force the decision on aid upon the 
Congress. Despite token rhetoric concerning the consequences of a fall 
of South Vietnam, it appeared that President Ford was more interested 
in making sure that Democrats in the election of 1976 would not blame 
him for losing Southeast Asia. At the same time. Congress avoided the 
moral side of the Vietnam issue by refusing to realize the critical 
role that the United States had in the enforcement of the Paris Accord. 
Sensing the anti-war sentiment, however. Congress had nullified the 
Nixon Doctrine and unilaterally changed America's foreign policy toward 
Asia. The tragic part was that the Congress, in hopes of avoiding the 
political issue, failed to allow the political process to work because 
it refused to allow a vote on the President's request. Congress never 
voted on Ford's request for $722 million in emergency military aid and 
the President acquiesed to the will of the people. Politically, the 
issue evolved into an acceptable stalemate with neither Congress nor the 
President held to blame for the fall of Indochina. 
Planning for Evacuation 
With the aid controversy raging in Congress, the State Department 
reluctantly and half-heartedly began making plans for withdrawal of 
Americans and "high risk" Vietnamese. The first indication the Department 
planned to evacuate refugees came no earlier than late March. Although the 
11 
military situation did not appear hopeless, the Department discreetly 
ordered its embassy in Saigon to start providing weekly status reports 
regarding the total numbers and welfare of Americans and others for 
18 whom the United States had emergency evacuation responsibility. The 
"others" which the order did not clearly explain included a broad 
category of Vietnamese which the State Department fe]t it had a moral 
obligation to evacuate because of possible reprisals by a new 
Communist regime. For example, these refugees included close friends of 
American citizens, Vietnamese employees of the United States government 
and their families, ranking Government of South Vietnam officials and 
1 Q 
their families. To the Saigon Embassy, the State Department order 
also appeared ambiguous because it lacked the necessary criteria for 
explaining how many "others" the embassy could designate for evacuation. 
Besides, Ambassador Graham Martin felt there was no reason to evacuate 
Americans, let alone Vietnamese, because he believed that the American 
government would change its mind on the aid issue if the situation 
20 
reached the critical point. 
While Thieu's decision to surrender the northern half of his 
country to Communists left hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese homeless, 
the resulting panic in Washington left Martin in rage. The State Depart¬ 
ment ordered Martin to discreetly suggest to non-official Americans that 
l^The President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, "Background 
Papers," May 19, 1975. (Hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee, 
Papers.) 
^Ibid. 
^^Thomas interview. 
12 
they consider sending out their dependents and to designate "high risk" 
Vietnamese for evacuation.Martin refused, arguing that such a move 
could prematurely cause the Saigon government to collapse. 
Meanwhile in Washington, less than two weeks after the Da Nang 
debacle, the President for the first time publicly indicated that he 
might authorize the evacuation of Vietnamese refugees. Ford, in his 
State of the World Address on 10 April, told the Congress: 
1 must, of course, as I think each of you would, consider 
the safety of nearly 6,000 Americans who remain in South 
Vietnam and the tens of thousands of South Vietnamese 
employees of the United States Government, of news 
agencies, of contractors and businesses for many years 
whose lives, with their dependents are in very grave 
peril. There are tens of thousands of other South 
Vietnamese intellectuals, professors, teachers, editors 
and opinion-leaders who have supported the South Viet¬ 
namese cause and the alliance with the United States, 
to whom we have a profound moral obligation. 22 
In prefacing his remarks about refugees, the President asked 
Congress to make a decision on aid by 19 April and revise laws to cover 
evacuation of "those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation 
9 ^ 
and whose lives may be in danger, should the worst come to pass." 
In Saigon, a demoralized Thieu considered the speech important because 
of what it did not offer: Ford would not unilaterally provide military 
equipment, let alone American troops, to prevent a Communist takeover 
in South Vietnam. 
O 1 
Advisory Committee, Papers. 
^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5933. 
23Ibid. 
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The following day Cambodia fell to Communists without a tear or 
eulogy from either the Congress or the President. The lack of emotion 
gave a preview of the presidential indifference which would greet the 
fall of Saigon two weeks later. Ford conspicuously failed to mention 
even the prospect of a fall in his State of the World Address the night 
before. Instead, he waited until 12 April to inform the Congress. 
Ford explained in a letter: 
On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communist forces 
had ruptured the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) 
defensive lines to the north, northwest, and east of 
Phnom Pehn and were within mortar range of Pochentong 
Airfield and the outskirt of Phnom Penh. In view of 
the deteriorating military situation, and on the 
recommendation of the American Ambassador there, I 
ordered U.S. military forces to proceed with the 
planned evacuation...^ 
Ford explained that the first elements of the United States 
forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 p.m. (EDT) on 12 April. 
This emotionless response, together with refusals by both Ford and the 
Congress to use American troops to stop the Communists, signified that 
the President was willing to accept the congressional decision to 
alter United States foreign policy toward Southeast Asia and to give 
up America's quasi-sphere of influence there. 
Two days later, 14 April, the State Department began to hasten 
evacuation plans and conveyed to its embassy in Saigon a limited parole 
authority for "high risk" Vietnamese which the State Department obtained 
^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S5934. 
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from the Attorney General at the urging of the President. The 
authority allowed the admittance into the United States of about 
70,000 Vietnamese who had relatives, either aliens or citizens, living 
4-1, 25 there. 
As late as 15 April, almost a week following the fall of 
Cambodia, the military situation around Saigon appeared so delicate 
that presidential aides told newsmen Ford and the Secretary of State 
felt that the Saigon government would see any effort to withdraw 
Americans as the final American abandoment of the Saigon government. 
Both reportedly feared such an act would also provoke hostile action 
by South Vietnamese troops or citizens against Americans still in 
South Vietnam. At the same time, Ford may have felt to ask for any¬ 
thing less than $722 million in emergency aid, although realizing that 
his request was futile, would have signalled his willingness to abandon 
Saigon and would have hastened the fall of Saigon. 
Meanwhile, the news media learned of plans to evacuate refugees 
by force if necessary. Newsweek reported that the President had 
approved a plan, code named Operation Talon Vise, to withdraw up to 
200,000 South Vietnamese who had been associated with the American 
effort in Vietnam. This number included a select group of political 
figures, military men and civil servants whose lives would plainly be 
threatened if the Communists took power. The plan called for the use 
of helicopters to pick up evacuees from outlying areas, including a 
^Advisory Committee, Papers. 
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small number of Vietnamese who had worked for the Central Intelligence 
Agency's Phoenix Program, which had liquidated thousands of Vietnamese 
who had worked for the Viet Cong. The plan called for the evacuees to 
fly out of Tan Son Nhut airport, located near Saigon, or sail by ship 
from the port city of Vung Tau, 40 miles southeast of Saigon. The plan 
frightened the Pentagon, Newsweek reported, because it feared such a 
plan would create a logistical nightmare and that it would take at least 
six divisions of American troops to secure the airport, and deal with 
panicky crowds. Also, the Pentagon feared the possibility that American 
troops would have to fight their way in and out of the nation against 
Viet Cong, North Vietnamese Army troops and perhaps vengeful South 
Vietnamese. 
On 17 April, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, attempting to 
calm emerging anti-refugee sentiment, "clarified" the President's State 
of the World Address statement which hinted the United States would 
accept refugees from South Vietnam. Before a meeting of the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, Kissinger said: 
If the worst should come to pass and if it were not 
possible to stabilize the situation, we feel we have 
a moral obligation to help in the evacuation of those 
whose association with us now endangers their lives.^ 
0 A 
Newsweek, April 21, 1975. 
2/Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Evacuees, "Report on 
President Ford's Refugee Resettlement Program," June 19, 1975. 
(Hereinafter cited as Kennedy subcommittee.) 
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By this time the President realized the worst had already come to 
pass and that Congress would not appropriate funds for emergency aid. 
At the same time Ford foresaw the development of another sticky political 
situation—the refugee problem. The following day, 18 April, Ford 
announced the creation of a special Inter-Agency Task Force consisting 
of 12 governmental agencies which would coordinate the evacuation of 
Americans, Vietnamese and third-country nationals. Ford also charged 
the Task Force with handling refugee and resettlement problems. 
To coordinate activities within the Task Force, Ford appointed 
Ambassador L. Dean Brown as his special representative. Brown, formerly 
ambassador to Senegal, The Gambia and Jordan, quickly assembled a small 
staff of officers from various governmental agencies and began planning 
for the evacuation, staging areas in the Western Pacific, and reception 
centers in the United States.^ 
In Saigon, Ambassador Martin did not appear as pessimistic as 
Washington officials. He continued to believe as late as 21 April that 
Thieu, with military aid from the United States, could save South 
Vietnam and that a premature evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese 
could tip the balance against Saigon. Therefore, he vetoed proposals 
to start moving Vietnamese embassy employees quietly from Saigon. 
•^Inter-Agency Task Force on Indochina Refugees, "Report to 
Congress," June 15, 1975. The 12 agencies included Departments of: 
State; Health, Education and Welfare; Treasury; Defense; Justice; 
Interior; Labor; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Agency 
for International Development; Office of Management and Budget; 
Central Intelligence Agency. 
29Ibid. 
30]S[ewsweek, April 21, 1975. 
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Congress and Evacuation 
As the military situation reached the critical point on 24 April, 
congressional disgust with the military aid controversy seeped into 
State Department efforts to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese from South 
Vietnam. Only five days before the surrender of Saigon, Representative 
John L. Burton of Colorado reported to the House there had been a 
decline in the evacuation of Americans. Burton told the House that on 
21 April the State Department evacuated only 574 Americans and 369 
dependents and far less on 22 April—only 354 Americans and 225 
dependents. The slow evacuation left in danger some 2,243 officials 
and their dependents. Burton said. He also told his colleagues that he 
feared a fall of South Vietnam would give Ford the excuse to intervene 
with American troops to evacuate Americans who were stranded in the 
■31 country. JJ- 
In the Senate, Dick Clark of Iowa echoed Burton's disgust with 
the State Department evacuation efforts. He told the Senate on 28 April: 
In spite of the increasingly dangerous situation, the 
number of Americans being brought out has slowed to 
something less than a trickle. The net reduction is 
65 American citizens. In the meantime, more than 
6,600 South Vietnamese were evacuated in the same 
period.32 
•^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., E2022. Burton 
failed to mention that many Americans resisted leaving the country 
until the last minute. 
32Ibid> S6882. One major obstacle, however, was the fact that 
the Saigon government was extremely reluctant to grant exit visas. 
The 6,600 figure included orphans and Vietnamese dependents of 
Americans. 
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Clark said that during the 48-hour period the State Department 
had reduced the number of Americans remaining in South Vietnam by only 
141, leaving 950 still here. At the present rate, he said, evacuation 
would take two weeks to complete. 
The same day, one day before Saigon fell, Speaker of the House 
Carl Albert read a letter from President Ford which notified him that 
Ford intended to authorize the use of Indochina Postwar Reconstruction 
funds to finance the evacuation from South Vietnam of certain South 
Vietnamese and nationals from other foreign countries. 
Seeing the approaching end, Ford made one last feeble attempt to 
secure additional emergency aid. In addition, the President said he 
did not believe the $70 million authorized by Congress for resettling 
70,000 refugees would sufficiently cover costs for evacuation and re¬ 
settlement of possibly 140,000 South Vietnamese. Stressing the need 
for additional funds, he warned the House: 
The failure to evacuate these people from South 
Vietnam would leave them in danger of harm, perhaps 
even death in the face of Communist aggression, and 
would cause serious question in the eyes of other 
nations regarding the U.S. government's humanitarian 
conscience toward those with whom it has been closely 
associated and allied with for many years.^ 
At the Pentagon, officials believed the State Department had 
dodged the evacuation issue too long. In the next to the last week 
~^Ibid, H3348. Ford's letter was dated April 25, 1975. He 
based his authority on section 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961. 
-^Ibid. 
19 
in April, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger had dispatched 44 
American naval vessels, 6,000 Marines, 120 Air Force combat and tanker 
planes and 150 Navy planes in anticipation of the final evacuation. 
Nevertheless, Ambassador Martin in Saigon continued to argue that the 
final withdrawal of Americans from Saigon would trigger panic in Saigon 
and hasten the fall of the Government of South Vietnam.^ 
As Communist forces approached within artillery range of Saigon, 
the State Department finally, but tragically too late, defined several 
categories of Vietnamese targeted for evacuation. On 28 April Wash¬ 
ington authorized the embassy to evacuate 
1. up to 4,000 orphans. 
2. 1,000 to 75,000 relatives of American citizens or permanent 
resident aliens. 
3. 50,000 "high risk" Vietnamese, including past and present 
American government employees; officials whose cooperation 
was necessary for the evacuation of American citizens; 
individuals with knowledge of sensitive government 
intelligence operations; vulnerable political or intellectual 
figures; Communist defectors; employees of U.S. firms 
operating in Vietnam; employees of voluntary agencies; 
certain labor officials; and participants of U.S. govern¬ 
ment sponsored programs. 
With a final massive evacuation planned. Congress reacted to the 
President's plan for bringing thousands of refugees into the United States. 
Despite an obvious moral obligation to evacuate thousands of "high risk" 
■3 c; 
Thomas interview. 
-^Kennedy Subcommittee. It is doubtful whether earlier planning 
by the State Department would have allowed a large number of Vietnamese 
to leave. The Government of South Vietnam, until shortly before the 
collapse, insisted on the normally long and costly procedure for exit 
visas. 
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Vietnamese who had worked for the United States Government at one time, 
there ensued a heated debate. Numerous politicians feared unemployed 
refugees would only add to the nation's failing economy and social 
problems while others noted that the French still had problems with the 
27,000 Vietnamese refugees they evacuated after their defeat at Dienbienphu 
in the 1950s. Twenty years later about 500 Vietnamese still lived in 
a temporary camp about 80 miles from Bordeaux.^ 
Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, reflecting the mood of the 
O Q 
Senate, said he had "serious reservations" about the President's plan. 
In a speech on 28 April he told his colleagues: 
The United States currently has a jobless rate of 8.7 
per cent, the highest since 1941, and our overall 
economic picture—the recession, inflation, national 
debt, gross national product—is far from bright. 
Adding well over 100,000 South Vietnamese to that 
picture will not help the United States. 
The Senator asked: Where would the evacuation line be drawn? 
Should the government evacuate all Vietnamese who worked for or with 
Americans in South Vietnam? Should the United States evacuate all who 
had a connection with the South Vietnamese government? Or should it 
evacuate only high-ranking officers of the armed forces? Or should 
the United States seek to provide asylum for all who fought against the 
Communists? He added: 
■^New York Times, April 29, 1975 
^Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., S6882. 
-^Ibid. 
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If large numbers are endangered, then other countries 
as well as our own should open their gates to them, 
especially those countries that have cultural 
similarities to Vietnam. The State Department—to 
say nothing of the United Nations—ought to be moving 
in that direction.^ 
In the Senate, on the other side of the controversy, Senator 
Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania emerged as the President's defender and 
primary backer concerning evacuation planning and the resettlement 
effort. Scott told his colleagues on 28 April: 
I would like these people coming to the United States 
to feel that we want them, that we welcome them, that 
we are glad they were able to escape to freedom. But 
I do not want to be part of any of this niggling or 
nitpicking about 'Don't send them to my state.' I 
would be glad to see them come to Pennsylvania and 
to be a part of our life, and we will welcome them.^-'- 
Scott told the Senate that America had always opened its heart— 
to the Hungarians, to the Cubans, to refugees from Bangladesh, Nigeria, 
India and "to all parts of the world that had seen suffering, to dis¬ 
placed and oppressed people.Chastising those who voiced displeasure 
with Ford's plan to bring such a large number of refugees to the United 
States, he said: "I am not going to ask others to do what I am not 
willing to do myself. I think it is sufficient to mention this simply 
because I do not want to be in a position of a politician telling other 
/ ^ people what to do."4J 
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Scott s offer, perhaps to his dismay, became an offer too good 
for the Pentagon to refuse. Following the opening of the three 
refugee camps in Arkansas, California and Florida, the Pentagon would 
grasp hold of Scott's "Open Heart" rhetoric and announce the decision 
that a camp would open in Pennsylvania. 
CHAPTER II 
PLANNING FOR REFUGEES 
We were aware very early... the government as a matter 
of policy was going to evacuate, or try to evacuate, 
some people...we were getting figures at that time up 
to a million and a half—Anthony Auletta, Department 
of the Army planner.! 
In April, as Communist forces captured provinces north of Saigon 
and the President and Congress squabbled over the military aid issue, 
the Department of Defense alerted the Army that it would have total 
responsibility for caring for as many as 1.5 million refugees should 
South Vietnam collapse.^ Faced with the possibility of such a logistical 
nightmare and armed with scant information from the State Department 
concerning the scope of the refugee situation, the Army's upper echelons 
reacted and set about making contingency plans to prepare dozens of Army 
posts across the nation as possible refugee camps. To say the least, 
the Army appeared hesitant about involvement in a refugee program. 
With fewer than 800,000 in its peacetime force, military planners 
realized that the Army could neither adequately continue its worldwide 
security missions nor maintain its readiness if it had to run such a 
large disruptive non-military mission. Historically, the Army had good 
reason for its reluctance about such operations. From the Civil War 
^Interview with Anthony Auletta, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Operations, Department of the Army, by E.D. Miller at Washington, 
D.C., July 24, 1975. (Hereinafter cited as Auletta, interview.) 
Ibid. 
24 
forward, the Army became bogged down with a series of disaster relief 
operations resulting from floods, tornadoes, hurricans and earthquakes. 
Governors in many of these cases protested the interference, or inter¬ 
vention, of federal troops and Congress many times refused, or simply 
failed, to reimburse the Army for supplies it had expended during 
relief operations. In addition, such tasks invariably interrupted vital 
military training and affected preparedness. Nevertheless, despite these 
traditional reservations, the Army began to realize in the last weeks 
of April that the failing military situation in South Vietnam would 
again force it to become involved in a tremendous humanitarian under¬ 
taking but another disruptive non-military duty. 
Initial Studies 
As in the past. Army planners and leaders reacted pragmatically 
about participating in such a venture. Although most had a great amount 
of compassion for the refugees because they had fought in South Vietnam, 
they quickly realized that involvement in a long-term resettlement 
program would, as in the past, drain combat units of their manpower and 
perhaps create morale problems among troops. Many also felt civilians 
in non-military government agencies should take responsibility for any 
type of program which dealt with refugees. As a result of these fears 
and apprehensions. Army planners at the Pentagon considered requesting 
mobilization of Reserve units of selected reservists to help ease the 
■3 
burden. 
3Ibid. 
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As the evacuation from Saigon reached its peak on 28 April, Major 
General Charles R. Sniffin, Director of Operations at Department of the 
Army, sent Army Secretary Howard "Bo" Galloway a feasibility study con¬ 
cerning the use of Reserve civil affairs units to help supply, feed and 
clothe an unknown number of refugees.^ Sniffin outlined three possible 
ways that the Army could use the Pveserves to help staff and run refugee 
camps if the task proved too large for the Active Army to handle. He 
first discussed the manpower problem. Selective mobilization of Army 
Reserve civil affairs units, Sniffin said, would solve this problem. 
Either the Congress or the President could approve mobilization under 
Sections 672 or 673 of Title 10, U.S. Code. Sniffin told the Secretary 
this course of action would provide the Army with the necessary manpower, 
but one important disadvantage "would be possible political repercussions 
accompanying selective mobilization for a Vietnamese related purpose."^ 
A second course of action Sniffin considered included using Reserve 
units during their annual training, usually a period of 12-14 days of 
summer training. This option was not only unfeasible but totally 
impractical since many unit personnel had unnecessary specialties such 
as finance and archives protection, the general said. The third option, 
which the Army ultimately would choose, somewhat because of political 
^Information Paper, Subject: Feasibility of Using Reserve Civil 
Affairs Units in Refugee Aid Program; from Maj. Gen, Charles R. Sniffin, 
Director of Operations, Department of the Army, through Chief of Staff, 
U.S. Army, to Secretary of the Army, April 28, 1975. 
^Ibid. 
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pressure to get reservists involved, included using selected reservists 
who would volunteer for tours of duty of 90 to 125 days to augment 
Active Army forces. This option appeared to be the best. Sniffin told 
Galloway. 
Sniffin's rationale for supporting the third option—if the 
State Department evacuated 1.5 million Vietnamese—proved realistic. 
In view of the heated debate over military aid to South Vietnam going 
on in the Congress, Sniffin realized that the Congress would never 
authorize mobilization of Reserves for a Vietnamese related action, 
unless the task of supporting refugees was too large for the Active Army. 
Meanwhile, meager coordination between the Departments of Defense 
and State in the weeks prior to the fall of Saigon, apparently caused 
by outward antagonism between Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger, 
appeared to compound the Army's planning problems. Although the State 
Department appeared to hasten plans for evacuation of Americans through¬ 
out April, the Defense Department lacked adequate information and a 
realistic estimate of the number of Vietnamese refugees State officials 
wanted to evacuate. By the time the State Department did advise the 
Pentagon of its plans to evacuate only 50,000 refugees—rather than 
1.5 million—it was already 22 April and the military situation around 
Saigon had reached the point that it appeared Saigon would fall any 
day. ^ 
^Message. From Secretary of State to Saigon Embassy, Subject: 
Indochina Evacuees, April 22, 1975. Schlesinger was critical of the 
lag in evacuation planning. He believed that the State Department 
should have evacuated Americans and Vietnamese in March and early 
April before the situation reached the crisis stage. 
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Defense Department planners, somewhat deceived by this belated 
revelation, tentatively believed that such a small number of refugees 
would create few problems, and hence failed to adequately inform the 
three subordinate military services of the potential gravity of the 
refugee situation. Compounding the communications problem between the 
Defense Department and its services appeared to be the preparation of 
contingency plans for the intervention of American troops into South 
Vietnam to either stabilize the military situation or provide the large 
security force needed to secure harbors and airports for a massive 
evacuation, if the President authorized such moves. Pentagon planners 
engaged in making such plans therefore had little time to worry about 
plans for refugees camps. That was a bridge which could be crossed at 
a later time, if needed. 
It was not until 22 April, one week before the fall of Saigon, 
that the Defense Department had enough information about State Depart¬ 
ment evacuation plans that it was able to determine that it would be¬ 
come involved in a refugee resettlement program. Only then did information 
trickle down from the Pentagon's upper echelons to the Army so it could 
issue guidance to its planning sections so they could cfeal with the 
7 
developing refugee situation. 
Upon issuance of the Defense Department directive which recognized 
the crisis, the Department of the Army told its planning sections and 
7Ibid. 
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the United States Army Forces Command in Atlanta, Georgia, about plans 
by State Department officials in Saigon to move up to 50,000 designated 
evacuees to safe havens either outside the continental United States or 
to installations within United States territories.^ 
With this initial guidance, it appeared to the Army that the 
State Department had drastically changed its plans to bring up to 1.5 
million refugees into the United States and that the Department planned 
to open camps for only a small number of refugees outside the continental 
United States. Therefore, Army planners rationalized there was no 
immediate need to request mobilization of the Reserves or to assign a 
large number of Active Army units to run refugee camps. Of course, the 
Army realized it would participate in the program to a degree, perhaps 
by providing a handful of advisory personnel who had specialties in camp 
operations. However, to the Army the important point was that the State 
Department would locate the camps outside the United States and take 
responsibility for the operation. 
The following day, 23 April, a telephone call from General Sniffin 
to Brigadier General William R. Todd, Deputy of Operations and Plans 
at FORSCOM, reinforced this assumption. Sniffin told Todd he had 
discussed the evacuation with a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who 
O 
Ibid. FORSCOM was directly responsible for the Army's efforts 
in Operation New Arrivals, the code name for the resettlement program. 
FORSCOM fell directly beneath the Department of the Army in the chain 
of command and had command authority over all Active Army, National 
Guard and Army Reserve forces within the continental U.S., Hawaii and 
Panama. FORSCOM replaced the old Continental Army Command in a re¬ 
organization in 1972. 
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had told him there would be no refugee camps opened in the United States. 
Todd recorded the information in a memorandum: 
To the extent possible, we will be using a major staging 
area on Guam to handle up to 50,000 evacuees either in 
buildings or tents. They (the State Department) hope 
to bring, at least initially, to CONUS (Continental United 
States) only those who have some form of sponsorship in 
the United States. After medically checked and screened, 
they would be moved to the United States, hopefully, right 
to destinations. No major staging facility (would be 
needed) in CONUS.9 
Todd added, however, that Sniffin personally considered this 
the "ideal case" and that Lieutenant General Donald H. Cowles, in charge 
of personnel operations at Department of the Army, wanted FORSCOM to 
prepare possible plans for handling a minimum of 20,000 refugees. 
In anticipation of a last-minute order to open stateside refugee 
centers, FORSCOM went ahead and started preparing surveys on the capa¬ 
bilities of inactive camps around the nation to handle refugees. As a 
result, FORSCOM earmarked three sites which it felt could adequately 
house and support refugees. FORSCOM believed Camp Roberts, California, 
followed by Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and Camp Pickett, Virginia—all 
inactive World War II camps—were the three best camps it could provide. 
In making its selections of sites, FORSCOM followed orders from Depart¬ 
ment of the Army to keep the camps located on the west coast and in 
the South because a warm climate would be best for Vietnamese.^ 
9Notes from telephone call. From Maj. Gen. Sniffin to Brig. 
Gen. Todd; 1200 hours, April 23, 1975. 
10Ibid. 
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During the telephone conversation between Sniffin and Todd, the 
question of utilization of Reserves came up again and Sniffin queried 
Todd about the impact refugee camps would have on summer training. Sniffin 
also warned Todd of a possible requirement of providing Active or Reserve 
Component support to Guam and to "also think about the possibility of 
using reservists to help run the camps.Todd summarized the con¬ 
versation : 
J4 hopes that we will not have to establish this major 
facility in CONUS, but we feel, as prudent planners, 
(it would be best) to organize. Dollars for this 
would be provided. Strictly contingency planning at 
this point. With the 50,000 (at Guam) that will be 
handled, there are 1,000 Cambodians. It is hoped 
that any number over the 50,000 in Guam could be 
handled through the U.N. Refugee Control Apparatus, 
but there is little international interest in getting 
involved in this thing. That is one of the reasons 
they are using Guam. It keeps it OCONUS (outside of 
the Continental United States) and thus makes it more 
international than if they were brought into CONUS.^ 
At 3:00 p.m. the same day the magnitude of the refugee situation 
began to unfold. The military situation around Saigon had reached the 
crisis stage and Thieu had resigned as president. Communists now were 
demanding that Thieu's successor, Tran Van Huong, resign from office so 
that a more receptive president could be appointed to surrender the 
government. It appeared that Saigon could fall at any minute and that 
the Defense Department might need to take extraordinary measures and send 
^Ibid. 
1
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troops into Saigon to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese. Sniffin again 
telephonedFORSCOM and said his office was about to prepare a message which 
would provide FORSCOM with planning guidance concerning the refugee 
situation. Sniffin also said the State Department that day had firmly 
designated Guam as a safe haven capable of housing only 25,000 evacuees, 
instead of 50,000. In the meantime, 6,000 refugees had arrived at 
Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and an additional 25,000 were 
on their way from Saigon to the Islands. In addition, demands by the 
Philippine Government to the State Department to move the 6,000 refugees 
out of the Islands immediately added to the mounting evacuation con¬ 
fusion. As a result, the Department re-routed all evacuation flights 
leaving Saigon to an already crowded Guam.^-^ 
At this point, the Army believed the only major problem it had 
to deal with concerned logistical support for the Guam operation. Depart¬ 
ment of the Army again told FORSCOM that it would need to provide only 
"housekeeping" troops, such as medical support and engineers to help 
organize and construct the camp on Guarn.-^ However, the following day, 
24 April, FORSCOM received the first indication the Army would have to 
establish refugee camps in the continental United States. Early that 
morning, Guam reached an overflow population of 50,000 and the Saigon 
Embassy reported it had identified an additional 190,000 refugees it 
1 ^ Memorandum of telephone conversation. Subject: Planning Guid¬ 
ance for Handling Vietnamese Refugees, April 23, 1975. Flights with 
passengers with major medical problems, however, stopped in the 
Philippines. 
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wanted to evacuate.^ Now, with 240,000 refugees expected, Department 
of the Army warned FORSCOM that the refugee situation in South Vietnam 
dictated the necessity to make contingency plans "to receive, process, 
billet and support evacuees at military facilities within the contin¬ 
ental United States.""^ However, the Pentagon again said it considered 
such a move necessary only "in the event that safe havens outside CONUS 
become saturated.""'"^ If such a saturation developed, the State Depart¬ 
ment would retain responsibility for the evacuee program, and would 
exercise operational control through the Interagency Task Force which 
President Ford established on 18 April, Department of the Army told 
FORSCOM.18 
Faced with this developing situation, Army planners at the 
Pentagon the same day finally started analyzing the capabilities of the 
inactive installations—Roberts, Chaffee and Pickett—which FORSCOM had 
earmarked earlier as possible refugee camps. FORSCOM waited through the 
day for the message from the Pentagon which would order the establish¬ 
ment of the first camp at Roberts to handle 20,000 to 50,000 refugees. 
The message, however, did not arrive. 
Also, in anticipation of a massive evacuation of 240,000 refugees 
from Saigon, the Department of Defense told the J4, the logistical 
■'-^Message. Department of the Army to FORSCOM. Subject: Con¬ 
tingency Planning for Possible Army Support of RVN Refugees in CONUS, 
April 24, 1975. 
16Ibid. 
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planning section of the Joint Chiefs, to make plans to move refugees to 
processing centers in the continental United States. In addition, the 
Department ordered the commander of the Military Airlift Command in the 
Pacific to prepare to transport refugees to ports of entry in the 
continental United States, if requested by the State Department."'"^ 
Until now, planners in the office of the Joint Chiefs had based 
their planning for refugees on the assumption that the State Department 
would evacuate only a small number of refugees, and therefore, there 
would be no requirement to open a camp within the United States. How¬ 
ever, the increasing realization that the State Department planned to 
evacuate more than a few thousand refugees and that the Army could not 
operate facilities by itself for possibly 200,000 refugees forced the 
Defense Department to tell the other services they too would operate 
camps. 
On 26 April, the Department of Defense notified the Navy, in¬ 
cluding the Marine Corps, and the Air Force that they would share 
responsibilities with the Army. Because of emerging political senti¬ 
ment against bringing refugees to the United States, the Defense Depart¬ 
ment apparently took the responsibility for selecting refugee camp 
locations from the hands of FORSCOM and moved it to the Joint Chiefs 
level. With this change, the Joint Chiefs ordered the Army, Air Force 
-^United States Air Force, Air Force System Command Armament 
Development and Test Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, 
"Operation New Arrivals: Phase I--The Buildup, 27 April-3 May 1975," 
Vol. I, July 1975. (Hereinafter cited as Air Force Historical Report.) 
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and Navy/Marine Corps to each nominate two refugee centers capable of 
handling up to 20,000 evacuees.^® The Defense Department told the three 
military services that the camps they nominated should have the capability 
of receiving the first refugees either on 28 or 29 April. 
With the two other military services now included in the operation, 
FORSCOM told the Department of the Army that it still considered Camp 
Roberts and Fort Chaffee its first and second choices for refugee camps. 
Department of the Army then forwarded the FORSCOM selections to the 
Joint Chiefs and made it clear that they had to quickly decide on camp 
locations because FORSCOM needed 48 hours to obtain clearances from 
the State of California for the use of Roberts.^ FORSCOM also needed 
the lead time to deploy Army personnel before the first refugees arrived. 
Department of the Army, in an effort to hasten the camp selections, told 
the Joint Chiefs it wanted "to address the matter immediately" and 
recommended that they arrange a conference with the other military 
services as soon as possible so camps could be selected.22 
The Air Force, also alerted by the Joint Chiefs that it should 
nominate two bases, set about selecting its sites. The Tactical Air 
Command Staff met at 4:00 p.m. on 27 April at the Pentagon and discussed 
the possibility of using airfields at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, the 
world's largest and most vital to the Air Force, and Holloman Air Force 
^^Message. From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chief of Staff, Army 
and Air Force, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant, Marine Corps. 
Subject: Evacuation of Refugees, April 26, 1975. 
^Message. From Department of the Army to J4, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Subject: Evacuation of Refugees, April 27, 1975. 
22Ibid. 
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Base at Alamogoreo, New Mexico, which could handle no more than 3,400 
refugees.^3 
The Air Force selected Eglin Auxiliary Field II, a 752-acre site 
located five miles northeast of Niceville and sixteen miles northeast 
of Fort Walton Beach, as its first choice. It considered the site its 
best possible camp because it provided an airfield, a road system, a 
10,000-gallon water tower, an underground water and sewage system and 
an electrical power source. In addition, the camp could support 20,000 
0 / 
or more refugees, if needed. 
On 30 April, the day after the last evacuation flight left 
Saigon, the Air Force Chief of Staff still had not informed the Eglin 
commander that his base would be used as a refugee camp. Feeling some¬ 
what in the dark. Lieutenant General John G. Hudson, Vice Commander of 
Air Force Systems Command at Eglin, sent a message to the Pentagon and 
asked for an immediate determination on how many refugees to plan for 
and when they would arrive. Hudson complained: 
The number is critical in that we would choose a location 
other than Eglin 2 if the number were substantially 
reduced from our current planning figure of 20,000. 
Use of Eglin 2 will disrupt the base intrusion surveillance 
system testing now going on there and cause an impact up 
to half a million dollars in additional cost and a 
scheduled slip of about six months.25 
Later in the day. General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, responded to Hudson's message and issued a directive to the 
^^Air Force Historical Report, p. 1. 
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Eglin command telling him to establish the center. He told Hudson the 
first refugees could arrive at Eglin as early as 3 May and that he did 
not believe the refugee level would exceed 2,500 at any one time. The 
camp should reach full capacity by 5 May, Jones said. Likewise, the 
Marine Corps received similar instructions from its commandant to use 
Camp Pendleton, California, as a refugee center.26 
With the decision made to use Camp Pendleton, compounded by 
pressures from aroused California politicians who did not want two 
camps in their state, the Joint Chiefs picked the Army's second choice— 
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. In the end, the Army, the first to plan for 
refugees, came out with the worst deal. The Air Force and Marine Corps, 
in order to insure their short-term participation in such a disruptive 
non-military duty, appeared to have located their camps at two 
strategically important bases. At Camp Pendleton, the Marine Corps 
created tent cities to house the refugees during the summer months, 
knowing that such accommodations would prove entirely inadequate during 
late fall and through the winter. This in turn assured a pre-winter 
camp closure date. Likewise, the Air Force selected its largest and 
most strategically important base as its refugee camp and provided the 
refugees with the same temporary tent housing as at Pendleton. As a 
result, a refugee camp at the Eglin camp disrupted essential training 
and forced the Pentagon to realize that a camp could not operate at 
^ibid. Like the Army, Jones ordered the Eglin commander to 
provide billeting, messing, medical treatment, transportation, security, 
safety, morale and recreation services for refugees. 
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such a critical installation on a long-term basis. 
In contrast, the Army made available its best installations to 
house refugees for an extended period. Although it selected three 
World War II vintage camps, the facilities were in excellent condition 
and capable of properly supporting the incoming refugee population. ^ 
Reservists and Politics 
Although most Army, Marine Corps and Air Force leaders considered 
the refugee program disruptive and non-military, a small group of 
politically active Army reservists felt differently. For this group, 
composed of about 7,000 reservists trained to deal with refugee problems, 
the resettlement effort offered an opportunity to aid them in their 
efforts to convince skeptical Army leaders of the viability of their 
specialties.28 in addition, the refugee program provided them a chance 
which they hoped to use to stop the Army from making further cutbacks 
in the civil affairs program. 
Faced with the need to cut expenses since demobilizing its 
Vietnam wartime force, the Army decided to phase out its civil affairs 
program. In previous years it had closed the Civil Affairs School at 
27 Both the Marine Corps and Air Force indeed were the first to 
get out of the resettlement business. The Eglin camp closed in 
August 1975 while the Pendleton camp closed two months later. The 
Army expected its two camps to remain open indefinitely. However, 
both had closed by January 1, 1976. 
■^Civil affairs specialties included: civil defense; public 
administration; education; finance; health, safety, welfare, legal; 
supervision of indiginous manpower; property control; food and 
agricultural management; economics and commerce; civilian supply; 
public communications; transportation; public works and utilities; 
arts, monuments and archives protection. 
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Fort Gordon and reduced Active Army civil affairs personnel from more 
than 1,000 to 119 individuals. In addition, the Department cut its civil 
affairs planning staff at the Pentagon from more than 10 to less than 
five during the previous years. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger 
also considered the civil affairs force top heavy and needless. In 1974 
he directed the phase-out of the program in the Army Reserve. However, 
strong political pressure by reservists upon politicians in the Congress 
prevented this. In the past, similar attempts by the Army to trim 
excessive fat from the Reserve program met similar opposition from the 
well-organized, politically conscious Civil Affairs Association. In 
addition, politicians, including Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina 
and Representative Robert L. F. Sikes of Florida, both major generals in 
the Army Reserve, proved sympathetic to civil affairs reservists and 
supported them in their fight against the Pentagon. 
Although the refugee program clearly required civil affairs 
specialties. Active Army leaders were hesitant to bring politically 
conscious civil affairs reservists on board to help manage the two Army 
camps. However, faced with persistent political pressure, and the Active 
Army's desire to get out of the refugee program as soon as possible, the 
Pentagon acquiesed and included Reserve civil affairs specialists in 
the resettlement effort. 
Political Pressure 
In early April, as speculation from the State Department con¬ 
cerning the evacuation of 1.5 million refugees reached the Army, the 
handful of civilian civil affairs planners at the Pentagon appeared more 
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than willing to commit reservists to the refugee program. This handful 
of planners who depended upon civil affairs reservists and the one and 
only Active Army civil affairs battalion for their livelihood believed 
that if State Department estimates proved true, the Army would need to 
request the President or the Congress to mobilize the Reserves to help 
establish a series of refugee camps around the nation.^ 
The group of planners in General Sniffin's office in April 
recognized that the Active Army could not adequately run several refugee 
camps since such a task would drain the Army of its strength and damage 
Army readiness. Sniffin, himself, concluded that the Army could use 
reservists with selected civil affairs specialties to augment the Active 
Army's only civil affairs battalion which had the responsibility of 
managing the refugee camp at Fort Chaffee.^O 
However, Sniffin expressed reluctance about using the Army Reserve 
in the program. Part of the traditional hostility which had faced civil 
affairs during the previous 30 years—the belief that civil affairs 
reservists were too political and "civilianized"—probably influenced 
Sniffin. Nevertheless, although Sniffin believed it feasible to use 
either individuals or units in support of the operation, he did not 
recommend such a move. Instead, he told the Secretary of the Army that, 
"the lack of a need for full-strength units, and...for the present time... 
^Auletta interview. 
30lnformation Paper. From Major General Charles R. Sniffin, 
Director of Operations and Plans, through Chief of Staff, to Secretary 
of the Army, April 28, 197 5. 
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the lack of a requirement for selected individual reservists serves to 
demonstrate no justification for Reserve CA units or individuals in 
support of current refugee operations at Fort Chaffee. 
In early May, when it became evident that the State Department 
had not evacuated anything near 1.5 million refugees, Sniffin again 
tried to prevent the use of civil affairs units and individuals in the 
resettlement program. However, the political possibilities of the 
program had tantalized some Reserve civil affairs officers who readily 
realized they could not let such an opportunity slip through their 
hands. As Active Army leaders attempted to drop the matter, this handful 
of reservists pressured their political allies—mainly Thurmond, Sikes 
and Senator John Stennis of Mississippi—to get reservists involved in 
the refugee operation. Sikes reacted quickly to the requests from 
reservists. Within two weeks after the first three refugee camps opened, 
the Pentagon reported that politicians had started to "persistently 
advocate" to Army planners that reservists should participate in 
Operation New Arrivals, the code name for the refugee resettlement 
32 program.J 
Congressman Sikes initially protested against establishment of a 
camp at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, which was located in his con¬ 
gressional district, because he feared refugees would complicate the 
Florida unemployment problem. However, he changed his mind. Like 
Senator Hugh Scott, Sikes probably saw the economic boost the camp would 
bring to the communities which surrounded the Eglin camp. 
3-*-Ibid. 
32Auletta interview. 
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Apparently on orders from the Secretary of the Army to involve 
civil affairs reservists in the program because of political pressure, 
Sniffin's office by 14 May had developed a plan which it hoped would 
satisfy the mounting political demands to use reservists. The plan 
called for the activation of 23 reservists who would volunteer for long- 
term tours of duty to form an ad^ hoc unit capable of replacing the 
Active Army's civil affairs battalion which FORSCOM had deployed to 
manage the refugee population at Chaffee. 
This token civil affairs force failed to satisfy Sikes who con¬ 
tinued to pressure the Army for involvement of at least 100 reservists 
at each of the three refugee camps. The Army, despite this useless 
organization which it had developed for political reasons, made several 
attempts to explain to the Congressman that the Chaffee camp needed only 
a handful of reservists.However, the Army's explanations did not 
satisfy Sikes. On 16 May, General Sniffin replied to an inquiry from 
General Weyand's office from Sikes concerning the possibility of de¬ 
ploying a 121-man Reserve civil affairs unit from Pensacola, Florida, 
to the Eglin camp for a two-week period.^ Sniffin explained the Army's 
plans to use only specialized reservists, rather than entire Reserve 
units at Fort Chaffee. He also said the Army had not identified a need 
for civil affairs reservists at the Air Force camp. The explanation 
O O 
It was somewhat of a white elephant organization because it 
included some useless specialties such as information officer, attorney, 
public welfare officer, four education personnel. These specialties 
were not necessary because other Federal agencies provided personnel 
with these specialties. 
^Pensacola fell within Sikes' congressional district. 
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again did not satisfy Sikes who continued pressing for involvement of at 
least 100 civil affairs reservists at each of the camps. 
Three days later, Major General Frank A. Camm, Acting Deputy Chief 
of Staff of Operations and Plans at Department of the Army, told FORSCOM 
it appeared Fort Chaffee could use 40 civil affairs reservists. The Army 
apparently made this move in hopes of stopping the political pressure 
exerted by Sikes. Camm also believed that the Army could further 
pacify Sikes if it could convince both the Marine Corps and Air Force 
to use 20 reservists at their two camps.35 
Meanwhile, Brigadier General James W. Cannon, commander of the 
newly formed task force operating the refugee camp at Chaffee, indicated 
he wanted nothing to do with plans to bring civil affairs reservists to 
his camp. General Todd, attempting to soothe Cannon, told him that he 
fully understood his fears that units could not adequately handle the 
camp operation. Nonetheless, he told Cannon, "there is a great deal of 
pressure brought to bear on the Army staff" to get reservists involved. 
Despite Cannon's mild protest, FORSCOM decided to bring the reservists 
to active duty.36 
As a result of this decision, FORSCOM on 20 May asked civil affairs 
units across the nation to find enlisted and officer personnel who would 
volunteer for duty with the refugees.3'' Response to the query indicated 
^Message. From Camm to Major General Jeffrey C. Smith, FORSCOM 
Chief of Staff, May 19, 1975. 
-^Message. From Todd to Cannon, May 15, 1975. 
-^Message. From FORSCOM to commanders, First, Fifth and Sixth 
Armies. Subject: Utilization of CA-USAR Personnel in Support of 
Operation New Arrivals, May 20, 1975. 
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that more than 100 volunteers were willing to enter on active duty for 
one, two or three months to provide civil affairs specialties. 
Meanwhile, Sikes' office told the Chief of the Army Reserve that 
the congressman still wanted at least 100 reservists, rather than 27, 
used at the three refugee camps and the scheduled new camp at Indiantown 
Gap. The Army concluded that it could accommodate Sikes if it increased 
the requirement at Chaffee and Indiantown Gap to 30 reservists each, and, 
hopefully, send 40 reservists to the other two camps. 
The Army then contacted both the Marine Corps and Air Force and 
asked if they could use 20 Reserve civil affairs personnel at both Camp 
Pendleton and Eglin Air Force Base. But neither the Air Force nor the 
Marine Corps accepted the offer. On 20 May, the Air Force explained to 
the Army that because of the limited size and duration of the Eglin 
operation, the base commander did not feel he needed Army civil affairs 
assistance.Likewise, on 29 May, the Marine Corps rejected the Army's 
offer. The Marine Corps explained that it did not need Army civil 
affairs personnel because the Pendleton camp already had Marine reservists 
with civil affairs expertise helping run the camp.39 
When both the Marine Corps and Air Force refused the offer, the 
Army decided it could not justify activating 100 or more reservists for 
use at its two camps and stood firm against additional pressure from Sikes. 
However, the Army did bring on active duty two increments consisting of 
38 Memorandum for the record. By Sniffin. Subject: Proposed Use 
of USAR civil affairs individuals in refugee camps, May 29, 1975. 
39Ibid. 
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31 reservists to supervise the housing, inprocessing, and feeding of 
refugees at Chaffee and Indiantown Gap. Officially, the Army made the 
decision to ease the burden placed upon the Army's only civil affairs 
40 battaion. Unofficially, however, it appears the Army made the decision 
to ease the pressures from a persistent congressman and politically 
conscious reservists. 
Planners also claimed the plans to use reservists were "coincident 
with limited but persistent expression of congressional interest." In¬ 
formation Paper. Special Operations Division, Operations and Plans, 
Department of the Army. Subject: Operation New Arrivals, June 4, 1975. 
CHAPTER III 
AMERICAN OPINION 
The people of Arkansas might as well realize what they 
are sacrificing, bringing these people over to this 
fertile country. The day will come when there will 
be booby traps in the Ozarks and sampans on the 
Arkansas River.—David Dahlem, Fort Smith, Arkansas, 
resident.1 
With plans made to open three refugee camps in the continental 
United States, the belated evacuation of American and Vietnamese refugees 
from South Vietnam entered its final stages. In the eight days prior to 
the collapse of Saigon United States planes evacuated nearly 40,000 
Americans and South Vietnamese from Tan Son Nhut airbase near Saigon. 
But, during the last week the airlift became increasingly dangerous as 
artillery and rockets fell on the airport. During one day of this last 
week, Communist artillery hit an American evacuation plan, setting it 
afire on the runway at the airport. A short time later, Communist 
artillery killed two American Marines who were guarding the United States 
Defense Attache's compound at the airport. ^ 
On 28 April, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Ford's Deputy 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, interrupted the President during 
a meeting on energy policy and told him that Option Four—a helicopter 
airlift—appeared to be the only way to complete the evacuation from Saigon.-^ 
Ford waited several hours before making the decision. Finally, Major 
-^Southwest Times Record, letter to the editor. Fort Smith, 
Arkansas, May 4, 197 5. 
^Time, May 12, 1975. 
^Newsweek, May 12, 1975. 
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General Homer Smith, the United States defense Attache in Saigon, reported 
that evacuation planes could no longer use the airport. Smith then told 
Ford the situation was out of control.^ Fifteen minutes later United 
States Ambassador Graham Martin telephoned the President and told him 
Option Four was the only way out of South Vietnam. At 10:51 p.m. on 
28 April, the President gave the order which signalled the beginning of 
Operation "Frequent Wind," the most dangerous of the four evacuation 
plans. 
At 1:08 a.m. the next morning, Kissinger telephoned Ford to 
report that the Navy had launched a wave of 81 Marine helicopters from 
ships of the Seventh Fleet off the Vietnam coast to Saigon to start 
the hasty pullout. Meanwhile, in Saigon embassy officials established 
landing zones at Tan Son Nhut airport and on a tennis court near the 
Defense Attache Office. Landing two at a time, the helicopters unloaded 
Marines—about 860 in all—to reinforce 125 Marines already on the 
scene to pick up an expected 4,500 refugees and evacuees.^ 
By nightfall the Navy had completed its evacuation from Tan Son 
Nhut. However, refugees designated for evacuation at the American 
Embassy still awaited pick up. As the Navy undertook this task, rain 
blanketed the city, reducing visability to about a mile. Helicopter 
pilots relied on flashlights and flares fired by Marines within the 
embassy compound to locate landing zones and evacuate stranded Americans 
^Ibid. Options One, Two and Three all included the use of 
transport aircraft to evacuate Americans and Vietnamese. 
^Time, May 12, 1975. 
6Ibid. 
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and Vietnamese. Through Tuesday night, thousands of Vietnamese who feared 
they would be killed by Communist victors tried to scale their way over 
the ten-foot barbed wire covered wall which encased the embassy compound. 
To hold back the crowd. Marines used tear gas and rifle butts.'' 
At 5:00 p.m. Washington time—5:00 a.m. in Saigon—Kissinger 
telephoned the President and told him that Ambassador Martin was then 
closing down the embassy and destroying its communications equipment. 
Twenty-two minutes later the Marine Corps completed the evacuation. By 
7:50 a.m. Marines had evacuated 1,373 Americans and 5,680 South Vietnamese 
from Saigon—more than the Pentagon had originally intended to remove at 
Q 
the last minute. 
Although the embassy officially had completed the final evacuation, 
tens of thousands of Vietnamese continued to head out to sea to escape 
Communist forces. For two days American ships lingered off the coast 
of Vietnam, plucking men, women and children from rafts, sampans and 
fishing boats. At night the mass of candles and lanterns burning on 
the water looked like a densely populated city from the air, one newsman 
reported.^ 
Officially, Washington did not know exactly how many Vietnamese 
had left South Vietnam. Officials at first guessed that the total 
neared 50,000. During the next few days the figure changed almost hourly 
^Florida Times-Union, April 30, 1975. 
^Jacksonville Journal, April 30, 1975. The week before, however, 
about 40,000 Vietnamese had been evacuated by airplane. The total 
evacuated by the United States reached about 80,000. 
90p cit, Newsweek. 
48 
and by 5 May the State Department claimed that as many as 127,000 Vietnamese 
might need sanctuary in the United States. 
Congress sharply criticized the last-minute evacuation and Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Refugee Subcommittee, accused 
government officials of "catastrophic bungling.Ambassador Martin, 
a
 bitter-end supporter, reacted to the charges by blaming the federal 
government for the fall of South Vietnam. In his first news conference 
following the evacuation aboard the USS Blue Ridge, he told reporters, 
"There was no reason to have had to leave Vietnam this way—if we had 
done as a nation, I think, the things we had said we would do and were 
basically doing for the first year after the Paris agreements.""'"^ 
He also said there were two sides to the whole story: "The Washington 
side and our side."-'-^ 
Meanwhile, as refugees headed toward staging areas in the Pacific, 
the three military services frantically prepared the three bases which 
the Defense Department had designated as resettlement centers. At 
Eglin and Pendleton, the first camps scheduled to open, Marines and Air 
Force personnel erected hundreds of tents and worked around the clock 
setting up mess halls and other facilities for the expected refugees. 
At Chaffee, primarily a summer training camp for reservists, soldiers 
prepared old World War II wooden barracks. To staff the camps, officials 
from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Health, Education and 
Welfare, and State Department arrived and prepared to screen and process 
-^Honolulu Advertiser, May 1, 1975, p. 1. 
12libicL 
4? 
refugees. Workers from voluntary agencies also arrived to find refugees 
homes in American communities. 
Opening the Camps 
When the White House announced the opening of the three camps, 
politicians and residents in California, Florida and Arkansas reacted 
bitterly to the President's plan to bring refugees into their states. 
In all three states Americans, fed largely by rumors, misinformation and 
outright bigotry, protested against the refugees. Thousands of citizens 
in the three states called or wrote politicians in Washington. In 
California, Representative Thomas M. Rees said he had received some of 
the dumbest phone calls he had ever received. He added, "They think of 
the Vietnamese as nothing but diseased job seekers...If Americans had 
thought that way in 1912, I wouldn't be here today. That's the year 
1 ^ my father came over from Wales.' ■L'3 Representative Norman Y. Mineta also 
of California said he had heard from some constituents who wanted to 
be helpful, but added he had received "some vitriolic messages with 
strong racial overtones."^ 
The State Department, in an effort to relieve the fears, told 
Congressmen from the three states that only 50,000 "high-priority" 
Vietnamese refugees would enter the three resettlement camps and that 
the federal government would pay the total cost of the resettlement 
program. They also claimed that refugees would pose no health hazards 
to local communities. 
l^Honolulu Advertiser, April 30, 1975, p.2. 
l^Ibid. 
-'--'Associated Press dispatch from Washington, April 28, 1975. 
50 
Meanwhile, rumors continued about the number of refugees which 
the President planned to bring into the nation. James A. Hayes, a 
member of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, recalled that 
on 21 April federal officials had told him of plans to evacuate from 
600,000 to one million refugees from Saigon."'"^ Representative John B. 
Moss of California, senior member of California's congressional delegation, 
attempted to get a clarification of the situation and arranged a 
meeting between the delegation and Ambassador Brown who was in charge 
of the refugee task force. Following the meeting, Moss told newsmen 
the delegation did not find Brown's plans desirable. However, Moss said 
the ambassador did assure the congressmen that the government would 
divide refugees evenly among the three reception centers and resettle 
them evenly throughout the nation.-^ Brown also assured Representative 
John Paul Hammerschmidt of Arkansas, whose district included the Chaffee 
camp, that the only demands the refugees would make "would be on the 
hearts of the people there who I think you will find will be swarming 
1 ft 
out there to see what they can do." 
Protests against the refugees also came from Florida, not only 
because of fear of disease and more unemployment, but because of in¬ 
adequate housing facilities at Eglin. Senator Lawton N. Chiles, Jr., 
the junior Florida senator, said the federal government had not consulted 
members of the Florida delegation about designating the air base a 
-^Florida Times-Union, April 28, 1975, p. A-2. 
1/lbid. 
18Ibid. 
51 
refugee reception center. He added: 
It seems to me like they could have found another 
base more adaptable to the program—an old base where 
they have some housing...We feel like in Florida we 
did our part for refugees. We've got 400,000 Cubans. 
You might say there was some logic to our having 
them because Miami is so close to Cuba, but my under¬ 
standing had been the Vietnamese would be resettled 
in Southeast Asia.-^ 
He also said Floridians wondered how long the refugees would remain in 
Florida. Added Chiles, "Some of our Cuban people were supposed to re¬ 
settle, too, and they would carry them off, but they'd home (return) 
right back to Miami."20 
Officials, meanwhile, moved to stop fears that many Vietnamese 
suffered from diseases which could infect the nation. Dr. Theodore 
Cooper, a physician designated by the President to be Assistant Secretary 
for Health and head of Public Health Service, said that the refugees 
posed no more of a problem to the health of Americans than the thousands 
of other travelers who entered the country from the Far East every year. 
He also reported that only a handful—80 or 90 out of a total of 34,000 
received on Guam and five out of 3,500 at Wake Island—required hospi- 
21 talization. 
At a hearing before Senator Kennedy's subcommittee on 30 April, 
Assistant Secretary of State Philip C. Habib reflected the federal 
government's continuing uncertainty about the size and nature of the 
^Honolulu Advertiser, May 1 , 1975. 
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resettlement problem. Habib admitted officials still did not know the 
precise number of refugees and remained unsure of how many refugees 
other countries would accept. He also estimated the cost of the refugee 
program during the first six months would include $55 million for the 
evacuation by air and sea; $30 million for setting up and operating 
staging areas in the Pacific and the United States; $75 million for 
food, electricity, water and other needs of the refugees; $2 million 
for clothing; $25 million to cover resettlement costs and perhaps $95 
million in federal payments to state and local governments for extra 
welfare and social services costs; and unspecified additional sums for 
such purposes as resettling some refugees in other countries. In all, 
he said costs would range from $300 million to $350 million for the 
first six months. He also said that he would not quarrel with Senator 
Kennedy's estimate that the cost for a one-year resettlement program 
might be $500 million.^ 
The first refugees arrived on 2 May at 9:23 a.m. in 56 degree 
temperature in Arkansas. Prior to their arrival, camp leaders went out 
of their way to assure Fort Smith civic leaders that refugees would not 
create health or economic problems for the local civilian community. 
Donald McDonald, the chief State Department official at the camp, told 
the leaders they had no reason to fear the refugees. He also said that 
80 per cent of the refugees had a fair knowledge of the English language; 
that 60 per cent were women, 25 per cent were children; and that most had 
middle, upper middle class and professional backgrounds.^-^ 
^Ibid. Kennedy made the estimate in his report on the refugees 
which was released June 9, 1975, also. 
23southwest Times Record, May 2, 1975. 
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The Ford administration on 3 May acknowledged that the number of 
fleeing South Vietnamese refugees had risen to about 120,000. The same 
day the President authorized entry for the 30,000 additional refugees 
heading for the Philippines by boat.24 As a result, the anti-refugee 
sentiment again flared. Public officials whined about the cost as they 
received letters of protest. A Gallup Poll conducted in the first week 
of May reported that a majority of Americans, 54 per cent as compared to 
36 per cent, did not want the refugees to enter the nation. 
In Hawaii, Patricia Stillman, reflecting the anti-refugee 
sentiment, wrote to the Honolulu Advertiser: 
Are the tens of thousands of refugees entering this 
country the same people who bought their way out of 
the Vietnam military, ran the black market there, 
trafficked in drugs, and are now prepared to buy 
their way into the United States? They can't all 
be wives and children of American servicemen or 
United States overseas citizens. If they have resources, 
why was that not used in their war against Communism?... 
Why should it be more difficult for a U.S. draft dodger 
to reenter this country than any number of Vietnamese 
who avoided their draft?^ 
Back in Barling, Arkansas, near the Chaffee camp, Mrs. Johnnie Calhoun 
told newsmen she and her neighbors would be out with protest signs to 
meet refugees at Fort Smith. She added, "They say it's a lot colder 
here than it is in Vietnam...with a little luck, maybe they'll take 
pneumonia and die."^7 Also in Niceville, Florida, near the Eglin camp. 
•^Honolulu Advertiser, May 3, 1975. 
Z^Time, May 12, 1975. 
^Honolulu Advertiser, Letter to the editor. May 3, 1975, p. 8. 
^!Jacksonville Journal, May 2, 1975, p. 1. 
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restaurant cook Bob Whitfield, commenting about the recession and the 
state's 6.1 per cent unemployment rate, said, "Everybody is thinking, 
why are they coming here?"28 
Politicians in Hawaii feared that the federal government would 
open a camp there to house refugees because of the warm climate and 
because of the Oriental culture. Governor George Ariyoshi, the first 
Oriental to hold such a state office, although not mentioning racism, 
said he was more concerned with unemployment and health problems than 
humanitarian need. 
By 4 May mail and telephone calls to congressmen were still 
running heavily against allowing South Vietnamese refugees into the 
United States. Representative Bill Alexander of Arkansas received 10 
letters in one day which an aide described as "most emotional."^® Senator 
Thomas Eagleton of Missouri received 100 letters with about 95 of them 
against admission. Senator James Buckley of New York received 200 letters 
with two-thirds against admission. Of the total, an aide to Buckley 
said, 10 per cent were hard core racists and another 25 per cent were 
biased against Asiatics.31 
Representative Robert L. F. Sikes of Florida also received a 
large number of telegrams, all against admitting refugees. And Senator 
Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania said he received nearly 2,000 letters 
and that the vast majority of them were critical, the primary reason 
O O 
being jobs. 
^Jacksonville Journal, May 1, 1975, p. 1. 
^Honolulu Advertiser^ May 3, 1975, p. 1. 
30Ibid. 
-^Tulsa Daily World, May 4, 1975. 
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Letters to the Southwest Times Record, a daily newspaper near the 
Chaffee camp, reflected the anti-refugee sentiment. Phillip Brown, a 
Fort Smith resident, wrote to the editor, "If President Ford is so set 
in his ways that he feels we need to bring all these refugees into our 
country, let him send them all to his home city and state of Michigan 
and let his own take proper care of them all." David Dahlem, also 
of Fort Smith, wrote to the editor, "The people of Arkansas might as 
well realize what they are sacrificing, bringing these people over to 
this fertile country. The day will come when there will be booby traps 
in the Ozarks and sampans on the Arkansas River. 
California officials, including Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. 
and both United States Senators voiced alarm at the planned influx of 
refugees into their state which had a 7.3 per cent unemployment rate. 
Brown told newsmen that "California's first obligation is to its own 
O C 
citizens." Mario Obledo, California's Secretary of Health and Welfare, 
cabled Secretary of State Kissinger and warned that the state could not 
afford to absorb large numbers of homeless refugees since it already 
had "952,000 unemployed; 2.4 million receiving some form of medical or 
welfare aid; 4 million near the poverty level; and 20 million paying 
taxes as close to the maximum tax as is acceptable in free enterprise."36 
Such worries did not remain unique to California. Chicago's 
Mayor Richard Daley commented that "Charity begins at home."37 
^^gputhwest Times Record, May 4, 1975, p. 4. 
34lbid. 
35Jacksonville Journal, April 24, 1975, p. 1. 
36ibid. 
37lbid. 
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However, Guam's Governor Ricardo Boradallo endorsed a resolution passed 
by the island's legislature which offered homes to 25,000 refugees.-^® 
Sociologists seemed confused about the anti-refugee sentiment. 
Americans in the past generally had welcomed refugees. David Riesman, 
a Harvard sociologist, told the Washington Post that Americans were 
full of self-pity. He added: 
We are justifying our grievances by striking out at 
others. The national mood is poisonous and dangerous., 
and this is one symptom, striking out at helpless 
refugees whose number is infinitesimal...this is the 
same country, after all, which absorbed 400,000 dis¬ 
placed persons from Eastern Europe after World War II. 
It took in another 200,000 East Germans who were 
fleeing from a Communist government in the early 1950s. 
It celebrated, almost euphorically, the arrival of 
40,000 Hungarians—'Freedom Fighters,' the last in the 
anti-Soviet uprisings of 1956. In addition, during 
the last 15 years, America absorbed at great expense 
more than 675,000 refugees from Castro's Cuba. 
Some sociologists speculated that the reason for the anti- 
refugee sentiment was latent racism aimed at Orientals which the sorry 
climax in South Vietnam brought to the surface. Others, however, 
offered more complicated theories about public frustration. Anitai 
Etzioni, director of Columbia University's Center for Policy Research, 
told the Post: 
Obviously, people are different with nonwhite races. 
It's widely suggested that we would not have dropped 
the atomic bomb on a white country. People in 
California have often talked about being overrun by 
the 'yellow hordes.' The color line has often 
affected how Americans feel about things.^0 
^Ibid. 
■^Honolulu Advertiser, May 3, 1975, p. 3. 
40Ibid. 
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Nathan Glazer, co-author of the book Beyond the Melting Pot, 
believed a change in the way Americans saw America 1 s role in the world 
caused the anti-refugee sentiment. He added: 
With the Hungarians and the Cubans, it was 'fight¬ 
ing Communism' and people supported that in the 1950s 
and the early 1960s. Now they've given up on that 
view...I don't think we feel on the same side 
politically as the South Vietnamese. The press has 
been so hostile to them—they've been described as 
corrupt, so unable to defend themselves. 
The press, sensing that Americans were acting out of character, 
quickly reacted to the anti-refugee sentiment. The New York Times told 
its readers in an editorial on 3 May that America's better instincts were 
on trial. The paper said it saw no way to shed the responsibility, pro¬ 
claimed throughout the nation's history, for providing a haven to those 
fleeing from persecution and conquest. The Times also said it was easy 
to be cynical about the agility with which some of Saigon's political 
and economic elites used to get themselves and their wealth out of South 
Vietnam, but added: 
To focus on a handful of such individuals is to 
distort the wider reality. The bulk of the immigrants 
have arrived here penniless, fleeing for their lives 
in search of freedom. Hard-pressed immigration 
authorities are nowhere near providing a breakdown of 
occupations; it is nevertheless evident that among 
the refugees are many thousands of persons capable 
of making a genuine contribution to American society 
once they find themselves. 
^New York Times, May 3, 1975, p. 18. 
A2Ibid. 
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The same day the Tulsa Daily World In Oklahoma also reacted to the anti- 
refugee sentiment. An editorial said: 
In a nation that spends multi-millions of dollars 
on dog and cat food, it sounds odd to hear someone 
complain that 'we can't afford' to help out a few 
thousand refugees from South Vietnam. 
An editorial in the Honolulu Advertiser also chastised those Americans 
who did not want the refugees to enter the nation. An editorial on 
3 May said: 
The ironies are striking: many Americans were willing 
to send their sons to die in the cause of defending 
the Vietnamese from communism, now many Americans 
seem unwilling to welcome those Vietnamese people who 
have fled communism...One can debate all sorts of 
things—the flaws in our past policy, the corruption 
of some among the refugees, the legality of their 
evacuation, etc. But anyone who doesn't feel this 
nation has some continuing obligation for our past 
role has missed a major lesson of Vietnam.^ 
Meanwhile, the Congress rejected the President's proposal for a 
$327-million bill to provide funding for the resettlement program. 
Opponents of the bill claimed that if Congress passed the bill, which 
Ford proposed before the fall of Saigon, they would permit the President 
to send American troops back to Vietnam. Others expressed concern that 
some of the aid destined for refugees that the United States had left 
stranded in Vietnam would fall into the hands of the conquering Viet 
Cong and North Vietnamese forces. Ford reacted strongly to the 
^Tulsa Daily World, May 3, 1975, p. 6. 
^Honolulu Advertiser, May 3, 197 5 , p. 8. 
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rejections and urged the House to quickly approve new legislation which 
would provide assistance. He also said "to do otherwise would be a 
repudiation of the finest principles and traditions of America. Ford 
said, "The vote does not reflect the values we cherish as a nation of 
immigrants. It is not worthy of a people which has lived by the 
philosophy symbolized in the Statue of Liberty. It reflects fear and 
misunderstanding rather than charity and compassion. 
Ford told the press he was "damned mad" about the reaction of 
Americans and Congress toward the refugees. In the following days, the 
President and his staff made painstaking efforts to convince the public 
and the Congress that refugees would not add to the nation's woes. At 
the same time, Americans of a more humane stock rallied to be heard. 
Letters to the editor in Arkansas newspapers clearly reflected the new 
emerging sentiment of a segment of the nation's society which favored 
the refugees. A letter from Jennie Hopkins of Fort Smith said, "I 
can't help but remember that this great country of ours was founded by 
refugees from other countries who came here to escape persecution.'"^ 
Farris Rogers, also from Fort Smith, wrote, "These people being brought 
here are coming because they cannot stay in their own land because of 
their friendship with us.'"^ And Nan Bartlett of Fort Smith wrote, 
"Our nation is preparing to celebrate 200 years of freedom. And the 
sounds being made by some Fort Smithians sound as though they have for¬ 
gotten why that first war was fought. 
^Southwest Times Record, May 2, 1975, p. 1. 
^^Southwest Times Record, May 6, 1975, p. 6. 
^Ibid. 
48Ibid. 
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Once the administration had convinced Americans that refugees 
would not take their jobs and that the federal government would incur 
all expenses for the resettlement program, apprehension melted away and 
Americans began to warm to the plight of the refugees.^ 
^Politicians also sensed this change of sentiment and passed the 
Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 197 5 which the 
President signed into law on 24 May 1975. The act allocated $508 million 
for the resettlement program, including $72.1 million for the daily 
maintenance at Department of Defense reception centers and $84.4 million 
for evacuation costs. 
CHAPTER IV 
REFUGEES IN PENNSYLVANIA 
...the local climate is one of watchfulness and quiet 
apprehension.—Brigadier General James W. Cannon, 
Commander, Task Force New Arrivals.^ 
Senator Hugh Scott's "open heart" speech before the Senate on 
28 April, in which he said he would welcome refugees settling in 
Pennsylvania, made the Department of Defense realize it had a political 
2 friend. The fact that the Senator publicly offered refugees a state 
welcome appeared somewhat unusual to the Pentagon. In California, 
Florida and Arkansas, where the Pentagon opened refugee camps, governors 
and politicians voiced skepticism Jind hostility to the resettlement: 
program mainly because they feared refugees would inflate state un¬ 
employment rolls and increase social problems. In contrast, Scott, the 
minority leader in the Senate, emerged as an ally of President Ford's 
resettlement effort who willingly chastised politicians for their 
unhumanitarian attitudes. Confronted with this latent political 
hostility toward the resettlement program, and the need to open a fourth 
refugee camp, the Department of Defense remembered Scott's friendship 
and offer. 
Planning the New Camp 
From the beginning, FORSCOM and Department of the Army considered 
Camp Roberts, California, as the Army facility which could best 
1 Message. From Cannon to Brigadier General William R. Todd, 
June 2, 1975. 
2 Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. , S6882. 
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support refugees. However, the political decision by the Joint Chiefs 
to use Camp Pendleton and not open Camp Roberts forced the Army to use 
its second choice—Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. 
Even after the Army opened its Arkansas camp, FORSCOM again 
insisted that it considered Camp Roberts its first choice, if a need 
for another camp developed. Despite FORSCOM's strong feelings about 
Roberts, General Sniffin's office on 13 May, two weeks after the opening 
of Chaffee, asked FORSCOM to determine if Fort Indiantown Gap could 
house 20-50,000 refugees for a long-term period.-^ 
FORSCOM became somewhat disturbed by this apparent political 
move which seemed to ignore weeks of sound planning. Nevertheless, 
faced with objections, Department of the Army ordered FORSCOM to look 
at Fort Indiantown Gap and determine if the camp could open within a 10 
to 14-day period. Department of the Army again, perhaps to soothe 
FORSCOM, hinted that Army personnel would establish the camp, but hope¬ 
fully, a federal agency would take over camp operations.^ While making 
its assessment, the Pentagon told FORSCOM to look specifically at the 
old post hospital; facilities for language and skill training; schools 
for children, either on or off post; airport facilities located within 
a 50-mile radius; and the climate of the area. 
Having received the request, Major General Gordon J. Duquemin, 
in charge of operations and plans at FORSCOM, quickly informed the 
-^Memorandum for the Record. Subject: Possible Use of Fort 
Indiantown Gap to House RVN Refugees, May 13, 1975. 
4Ibid. 
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FORSCOM Chief of Staff that "FORSCOM's answer is no."^ He said he con¬ 
sidered the hospital "so-so" and that the post lacked schools for 
children, on and off post; that Harriburg, located 16 miles away, had 
only a marginal airport; and that the climate appeared too cold for 
Vietnamese.^ 
Meanwhile, the same day the Chief of the Army Reserve at the 
Pentagon prepared a memorandum for General Sniffin's office concerning 
the impact a new refugee camp would have on Army Reserve annual training. 
Of the three camps under consideration, the Army Reserve believed opening 
a camp at Roberts would affect summer training least because it would 
have to move only 3,340 reservists to another camp during the 31 May to 
2 August training period. 
The Army Reserve considered Pickett, with 3,150 Reserve personnel 
scheduled for training between the period 18 May and 30 August, the 
second best choice for a new refugee camp. In addition, it considered 
Indiantown Gap, with its 7,797 reservists scheduled for the 4 May through 
30 August training period, the worst choice for a new camp.^ 
At the same time, Sniffin's office asked the National Guard 
Bureau to conduct a survey concerning the impact a new refugee camp 
would have on Guard training. The Bureau, however, reached opposite 
conclusions to those of the Army Reserve. Indiantown Gap had 7,545 
National Guardsmen scheduled for training while Picket had 7,588 and 
Roberts had 7,233. Brigadier General Joseph R. Jelinek, Deputy Director 
5Ibid. 
^Ibid. 
^Memorandum. From Office of Chief of Army Reserve to Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. Subject: Operation New 
Arrivals, May 13, 1975. 
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of the Guard, said movement of Guard units to other sites definitely would 
create problems and recommended Fort Indiantown Gap as the Guard's first 
choice. The Guard considered Pickett the second best choice followed by 
Roberts.® 
Planners also brought the Army's personnel office into the planning. 
The office said it had no objections, from the manpower viewpoint, to 
any of the three installations because selection of any post ultimately 
would require the Army to provide personnel. Citing the shortages of 
Army cooks which the Chaffee camp had created, the office told Sniffin's 
office it should consider the use of contracted civilians to ease some 
manpower shortages.^ 
Although the Army worried about the impact on Reserve training, 
it considered the public affairs impact more important in the selection 
of its second camp site. The Pentagon felt that of the three posts under 
consideration it should select the post that appeared in the best physical 
condition. Adding that television coverage at Fort Chaffee showed a 
well-maintained post, Sniffin's office said, "to show any other image 
has the potential for public affairs problems."^ in short, the lower 
the state of repair of the post, the greater the public affairs problem, 
the Pentagon felt.^ 
^Memorandum. From National Guard Bureau to Colonel Chamberlain, 
Directorate for Military Support. Subject: Impact on National Guard 
Training, May 13, 1975. 
Memorandum. From Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Personnel to Directorate of Military Support. Subject: Impact on the 
Nomination of an Installation to be Utilized for the Establishment of a 
Refugee Processing Relocation Center, May 13, 1975. 
■'-^Memorandum. Impact analysis made by Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Operations and Plans, May 13, 1975(?). 
Hlbid. 
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From the community relations viewpoint, Department of the Army 
concluded that California would pose the greatest problem because the 
governor of the state already had one refugee center which he disliked. 
To put a second refugee center in California for an extended period 
"would add fuel to an already smoldering fire," the office said."^ 
The office also considered Virginia, the location of Camp Pickett, 
a potential problem. Senator William S. Scott, the junior senator from 
the state, was the only senator who had voted "nay" on the Senate 
resolution which welcomed the refugees, and the Army considered Senator 
Harry F. Byrd's position on the refugees questionable. However, the 
situation in Pennsylvania looked different. Sniffin's office said: 
On the other hand, Pennsylvania's Senator Scott(R), Senate 
Minority Leader, has suggested the possible use of 
Indiantown Gap Military Reservation (IGMR) for refugee 
reception. This would indicate political cooperation 
for use of IGMR. IGMR is in a somewhat reomote section 
of Pennsylvania and no significant public affairs 
community relations impact is anticipated. Of the three 
posts under consideration, IGMR is the most favorable 
from the PA viewpoint, followed by Pickett and Roberts.-'-^ 
On 14 May, the day after Department of the Army ordered FORSCOM 
to look at Indiantown Gap, Eric von Marbod, Deputy Assistant to the 
Secretary of Defense, assumed Defense Department leadership in the 
refugee Task Force. The same day he visited Indiantown Gap with a 
party of four, including a Vietnamese physician. At von Marbod's request, 
the post commander, Colonel Ervin Johnson, escorted the group on a tour 
12Ibid. 
13Ibid. 
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of the post. Following the visit, Johnson told FORSCOM that von Marbod 
appeared pleased with what he saw and spoke in terms of housing 15,000 
refugees at the camp.^ 
Apparently von Marbod had made the decision to use Indiantown Gap 
before he arrived at the installation. Johnson said von Marbod told him 
he thought the Army would receive an order to establish the camp on or 
about 19 May, which would allow about 10 days to build up the camp's 
cadre. Von Marbod also believed the Army could work out any difficulties 
with Reserve training by rescheduling or relocating it.-'--' He also 
indicated that a small military cadre of about 200 would suffice for 
support of the operation and told Johnson he hoped the State Department 
could quickly take over the refugee camps and resettlement program. 
It appeared to Johnson that von Marbod felt that the Defense 
Department would select Indiantown Gap as the fourth camp. Colonel 
Johnson reported to General Todd at FORSCOM that von Marbod told him 
that Senator Scott made an offer to house refugees at Indiantown Gap 
to the President and the Secretary of Defense. He also said that the 
camp facilities, including barracks, mess halls, clubs, and the gymnasium 
favorably impressed von Marbod and his group. Johnson said von Marbod 
believed the facilities at Indiantown Gap were better than those at 
Chaffee. Johnson also reported von Marbod believed the best way to 
-^Message. From Todd to Cannon. Subject: Possible Establishment 
of Refugee Camp at Fort Indiantown Gap, May 14, 1975. Johnson was an 
Active Army officer. 
1^Memorandum. From Colonel Ervin Johnson to Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Operations and Plans, FORSCOM, May 15, 1975. 
"ibid. 
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provide cadre, about 200, for the new camp would be to transfer them from 
Fort Chaffee directly to Indiantown Gap. The Adjutant General of 
Pennsylvania, Major General Harry J. Meir, reacted furiously to von 
Marbod's visit and said he would see General Walter T. Kerwin, Vice Chief 
of Staff of the Army, "to get this stopped.""'"^ Johnson summarized about 
von Marbod's visit: 
In each area Dr. Hung (the Vietnamese physician) wanted 
to know the location of the chapel and was highly impressed 
with chapels visited. In the worst areas we pointed out 
the undesirability and in each instance the reactions were 
the same, "completely satisfactory and much better than 
tents." Although no commitment was made by Mr. von Marbod, 
he implied that the facilities were much better than he 
expected and that we could surely accommodate 15,000. 
Although Lieutenant Colonel Wampler (deputy post commander) 
and I continually pointed out certain cautions, there was 
no doubt in our minds that he intended to use this 
installation to house 15,000, although he did not say so 
directly.18 
Johnson also said he had indicated his apprehensions about the 
ability of post personnel to adequately support refugees to von Marbod, 
but von Marbod continually reiterated that he would try to get 
experienced Army cadre from Chaffee to support Indiantown Gap. When 
Johnson explained the northern location of the camp, the cold winters 
and that the camp had to heat as early as late September, von Marbod 
said that "too far north was foolishness" and that the Army could heat 
buildings. He also said, because of the heavily populated northeastern 
United States, the State Department could easily find sponsors for 
■^Ibid. Meir was a political appointee of Gov. Shapp. He 
naturally reflected the response of his employer. 
l8Ibid. 
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refugees in that area. Johnson added, "He (von Marbod) also stated that 
money was not a problem and that we could hire off the street without 
regard to Civil Service registers...Conclusion: We just bought 15,000 
Vietnamese refugees and may receive a cadre of only 200. 
The following day, 15 May, FORSCOM acquiesed to the political 
decision and accepted the fact that the Pentagon planned to open 
Indiantown Gap as the next camp. Taking a more positive approach, 
FORSCOM operations and plans analyzed the capabilities at the proposed 
camp and concluded that it could accommodate at most 26,000 refugees, 
and about 2,900 Army personnel who would run the camp. In addition, 
engineers could rennovate the installation's 883-bed hospital, FORSCOM 
said. FORSCOM considered the climate, although not the best, 
acceptable for Asians. The annual temperature averaged 50 degrees, 
and ranged frorn^a low of 27.6 in February to a high of 7 3.3 in July. 
FORSCOM also considered the old World War II built facilities basically 
in good condition, as compared with those at other inactive installations, 
and believed it would take a minimum amount of time to prepare them for 
refugees. 
In addition, the Pentagon believed the close proximity of 
Harrisburg would provide a source of civilian employees and family 
housing for government and military personnel. Indications from Senator 
Scott that Governor Milton J. Shapp would willingly have refugees 
19Ibid. 
^^Point Paper, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 
FORSCOM, May 15, 1975. 
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at the installation also meant he would willingly waive the 90-day notice 
) 1 required to revoke the lease of the camp to that state, FORSCOM felt. 
Opening the Camp 
The same day FORSCOM, armed with the official news that Department 
of the Army had selected the camp, started formulating an operations 
plan to prepare the camp. On 16 May, General Sniffin informed FORSCOM 
that General Cannon and an advance party would depart Fort Chaffee for 
Indiantown Gap not later than 20 May to establish a new camp to house 
14-15,000 refugees.^"*" 
Four days later, 20 May, Cannon and his advance party departed 
Chaffee for Indiantown Gap. By 22 May all military personnel from the 
Chaffee camp had arrived at Indiantown Gap and started forming a Task 
Force to provide logistical support at the camp. About 2,000 military 
personnel—somewhat more than von Marbod anticipated—had arrived at 
the camp to prepare it for the first refugees within a week. The first 
refugees arrived on 28 May and the camp population reached 15,000 
within seven days. 
Although the local residents around Indiantown Gap did not 
react as negatively as those at Fort Chaffee did, they clearly did not 
offer an "open heart" invitation to the Army or the refugees. As the 
^Message. From Department of the Army (General Sniffin) to 
FORSCOM. Subject: Task Force New Arrivals (Fort Indiantown Gap, PA), 
May 16, 1975. General Cannon, Commander of III Corps Artillery at 
Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was deployed by FORSCOM, along with the 46th 
General Support Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to Chaffee to 
form a task force. The task force directed the logistical operations 
at the camp, including feeding, housing, medical care and recreation. 
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Army expected, local leaders worried about the camp's 15,000 refugees 
affecting the state's unemployment situation. Governor Shapp, unlike 
Senator Scott, reflected these fears and appeared apprehensive about 
bringing refugees into Pennsylvania, fearing political repercussions 
from the state's unemployed. 
General Cannon reported to FORSCOM on 2 June, a few days after the 
camp opened, his impression of Shapp's reaction following the Governor's 
six-hour visit. Cannon reported: 
He (Shapp) seemed particularly concerned about the 
potential health hazards associated with such a large 
group of Asians (15,000). His tour of the hospital 
and concurrent discussions of health and disease 
problems... did much to ameliorate his fears that 
typhoid, leprosy and other exotic diseases would 
pose a threat to the local population.22 
Cannon said Shapp emphasized that the federal government had 
unilaterally decided to open a refugee camp in Pennsylvania without his 
counsel and that it (the government) would likely have some problems. 
Cannon reported the Governor generally said to him: 
We Pennsylvanians will tolerate this effort and, to a 
degree, will support it. However, don't visit your 
problems on us and conduct the affairs of the camp 
with as little disruption of normal activities in the 
local area as possible. Don't threaten our health, 
don't tax our water system and don't pollute our 
streams with sewage. 
2^0p cit, Cannon Message. 
23Ibid. 
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The same day, Shapp, Cannon and Richard E. Friedman, the Senior 
Coordinator at the camp, met with local officials for a two 
and one-half hour session. Following opening remarks by Shapp, Friedman 
spoke of the nature of the civilian effort involved in resettling the 
refugees and evacuees. Cannon also answered questions from the floor. 
Local politicians generally asked about the size of the refugee 
population and how long they would stay; the effect they would have on 
local unemployment; the types of diseases they had; how much money they 
had; opportunities for employment for local people; opportunities to 
provide contract goods and services; and security restrictions on the 
post. 
Following the meeting. Cannon told FORSCOM that the local leaders 
did not react spontaneously nor did they appear eager to help by 
volunteering their time, effort, or talents. Cannpn concluded: 
I am not at all certain that we have the full support 
of these local leaders. In the event decisions are 
made to increase the size of the refugee population 
here, these men will have to be carefully informed 
at the earliest possible time. My assessment is 
that they will not react to such news in a very 
positive manner. Basically, the local climate is 
one of watchfulness and quiet apprehension over the 
situation. Because of this attitude among the 
leadership, we could be in for some difficult days 
ahead, particularly if FIG (Fort Indiantown Gap) 
turns out to be a long-term operation or if a decision 
is made to increase the number of refugees housed here.^ 
Despite the initial apprehension over the new refugee camp, 
Pennsylvania politicians at the federal, state and local levels 
24lbid. 
72 
eventually profitted greatly from the resettlement program. Scott it 
appears was one of the few politicians to foresee that he could use the 
plight of the refugees—coupled with a large injection of federal funds 
into the state's economy—to his political advantage. Superficially, 
Scott's "open heart" welcome appeared humanitarian in nature. More 
importantly, however, Scott may have decided he could use the refugees 
and the Pennsylvania camp to help ensure his re-election in 1976.^^ 
Govenor Shapp, on the other hand it appears, at first did not 
realize he could use the camp politically. Nor did he realize the 
exact scope of the $508-million appropriation for the program. Although 
Shapp never publicly admitted it, the program brought more than $6 
million directly into the state's economy and virtually eliminated the 
unemployment problem in communities surrounding the camp which included 
Harrisburg, the state capital. It also brought scores of dignataries 
to the camp and publicity which Shapp needed in his race for the 
Democratic presidential nomination. 
The decision to use Indiantown Gap instead of Roberts proved a 
godsend for the Army. Unlike the Marine Corps at Pendleton, the Army 
experienced few public relations problems with Indiantown Gap. Un¬ 
doubtedly, the Army would have faced the same problems the Marine Corps 
experienced at Pendleton had it used Roberts. Also, unlike California, 
where 25 per cent of the refugees settled because of the warm climate, 
^Scott, however, announced in December 1975 that he would not 
seek re-election. Political enemies charged he received $10,000 a 
year in illegal kickbacks from the Gulf Oil Corporation. This probably 
was the reason he decided not to seek re-election. 
Pennsylvania with its cool climate did not experience a noticeable 
increase in its welfare rolls. 
For the most part, the Army's apprehension and fear about Indian- 
town Gap did not turn into reality. Whatever anti-refugee sentiment 
initially existed quickly melted as the economic benefits became apparent 
to local Pennsylvania communities. 
The second Army facility, situated in Pennsylvania Dutch setting 
in a valley at the foot of a small mountain, became an obscure, somewhat 
idyllic camp. It was free of the problems the Army feared most and at 
the same time served as a political tool for Pennsylvania politicians. 
CHAPTER V 
PERSPECTIVE 
Vietnam has indirectly chosen our 1976 Bicentennial 
theme: Don't Tread on Me—19776; Don't Count on Me— 
1976.—Ronald P. Winner, in a letter to the editor. 
Time magazine. 
The events associated with the fall of South Vietnam brought vast 
changes in how the American public perceived the United States as a 
humanitarian nation and the role that the nation should play in inter¬ 
national affairs. In foreign affairs, the public emerged for a time as 
an ex officio part of the foreign policy making apparatus. For the first 
time since the isolationist period of the 1920s and 1930s, the public 
had loudly voiced its opinions about America's international role. It 
had compelled Washington politicians to take heed of the wishes of 
millions who were thinking that isolationism—the traditional American 
approach to foreign relations—again might be the best policy. 
Faced by these strong anti-involvement feelings, the Congress 
during the last months of the Indochina war found it politically 
necessary to discontinue military aid to the Saigon regime. Whether 
it realized it. Congress, by reaction to the public's wishes, emerged as 
an equal, if not a temporarily dominant partner with the Executive in 
foreign policy making. Although Congress did not totally usurp the 
President's constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs, it had 
effectively limited his courses of action and options in Southeast Asia. 
^Time, p. 4. 
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Strong public disapproval of emergency military aid was something neither 
the President nor Secretary of State appeared to have expected. The 
isolationist and anti-involvement sentiment toward Southeast Asia, how¬ 
ever , coincided with the President's long-range plans. Therefore, 
little harm to America's position as a world power resulted from the 
fall of Indochina. 
Consistent refusals by the Congress to grant emergency military 
aid in 1975 nullified the Nixon Doctrine of 1970. The Doctrine, 
formulated to allow American troops to gracefully leave Vietnam, had 
proclaimed that the United States would provide the means, exclusive 
of American troops, to friendly nations so they could withstand 
Communist forces. Nixon's doctrine was pragmatic and in tune with 
political and economic developments in Asia during the 1970s. Specifically, 
the doctrine allowed the United States to take the first steps toward 
economic reconciliation with Communist China. 
The events of spring 1975 marked an unexpected second step in 
the gradual transformation of America's Asian policy. During the aid 
debate, and despite rhetoric criticizing Congress for nullifying the 
Nixon Doctrine, it appears President Ford was not totally dissatisfied 
with congressional moves. During the previous 10 years, American in¬ 
volvement in Vietnam had hampered serious discussions between Washington 
and Moscow on detente, strategic arms control, European security and 
the Middle East. In addition, American involvement in Vietnam also had 
prevented the United States from devoting time to Soviet and Chinese 
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overtures to increase trade and technical collaboration.^ With the fall 
of Saigon, tensions began to slowly melt and President Ford started slowly 
changing the course of American foreign policy. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was not unhappy about these 
changes. He admitted that the United States in the 1960s probably had 
3 
made a mistake by making a test case for American policy in Vietnam. 
He also said the United States could have come out in a far poorer position.^ 
The Secretary also gave a preview to what he called a "fascinating period" 
of realignment in Southeast Asia. He said Vietnam with its 42 million 
people and a good army, might become the major force in Southeast Asia. 
He said he also believed that Cambodia and Laos would eventually be 
satellites of Hanoi and that China and the Soviet Union would most likely 
compete for influence in the area. He also predicted that Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia would attempt to align themselves with Hanoi and 
that there might be a possibility that Hanoi might ask the United States 
to re-enter the area and help stabilize the situation. He also said 
China appeared afraid that the United States might leave that part of 
the world entirely and open it up to Soviet influence.^ 
Political scientists saw the retreat from Southeast Asia differently. 
Many believed it was not only a blow to American idealism but part of a 
2
 Alastair Buchan, Foreign Affairs, "The Indochina War and World 
Politics," July 1975. (Hereinafter cited as Buchan, "Indochina War.") 
3 Honolulu Advertiser, May 7, 1975. 
4 Hugh Sidey, Time, "Diplomacy: Henry Makes the Best of it," 
May 12, 1975. 
* Ibid. 
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larger process of a change in foreign affairs. Alastair Buchan, a pro¬ 
fessor of international relations at the University of Oxford, saw three 
significant results of the withdrawal of American presence from the area. 
These were:^ 
1. The United States was once again, as in the early 20th 
century, a strong Pacific power, but not a dominant one. 
2. A change in the structure of inter-allied relationships 
emerged with the fall of South Vietnam. American allies 
exercised, as a result of the withdrawal of American 
influence, more responsibility and initiative than a 
decade before. 
3. A change in the economic and monetary relationships between 
the United States and other powers also resulted. A 
dwindling supply of raw materials, especially oil, for the 
United States caused this new economic approach toward 
foreign relations. 
These three points signified one important thing, Buchan said—a change 
in the structure of world politics. 
Earl C. Ravenal, a professor at John Hopkins University, saw the 
Vietnam issue differently. He believed the consequences of America's 
demonstrated failure to act--however justified and right the decision 
may have been—were more important than the consequences of the loss of 
Vietnam itself. He went on to say that Americans had rationalized the 
fall of Vietnam by creating excuses and avoiding the real reason—the 
failure to live up to commitments. He feared the success the American 
public had in Vietnam by constraining the Executive might evoke similar 
restraints, or obstructions, in similar future situations. Inter¬ 
nationally, he feared that the collapse of South Vietnam not only 
^Buchan, "Indochina War." 
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destroyed the premises of the Nixon Doctrine, but provided an early clue 
to the instability of the present balance of power system. He said: 
The dilution of American guarantees makes it both more 
necessary and more feasible for allies to seek the 
protection of the adversary, to accommodate the adversary, 
to strike a posture of neutrality, to attempt equidistance 
between the great powers, or even to pursue self-reliance, 
perhaps to the point of acquiring a national nuclear force.7 
The political scientists who made these predictions, however, 
overlooked two important points. First, they did not realize that the 
Nixon Doctrine was designed merely to get the United States out of 
Vietnam. Second, they did not realize that with the fall of Saigon, 
North Vietnam emerged as a potential replacement or quasi-agent for the 
United States in Southeast Asia. Although the United States was no 
longer physically in the area, the presence of a strong, possibly united, 
Vietnam could accomplish the goals which American foreign policy makers 
had spent more than 10 years attempting—to create a powerful force 
capable of keeping the Chinese from pushing southward. With the emergence 
of a powerful Vietnam, the United States could rely upon Hanoi's strong 
army and traditional Vietnamese—Chinese antagonism to keep Communist 
China from expanding its influence throughout Southeast Asia. After the 
fall of Saigon, Hanoi certainly had the war materials needed for such a 
task. With its victory on 29 April, the North Vietnamese inherited at 
least $5 billion worth of American military equipment.^ Not only could 
^Earl C. Ravenal, Foreign Affairs, "Consequences of the End Game 
in Vietnam," July 1975, p. 659. 
^Honolulu Advertiser, May 1, 1975. 
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Hanoi wage guerrilla warfare, but it also had the capability to conduct 
conventional warfare—something which American forces were never able 
to do. 
In a conventional war Vietnam could send 1,000 or more tanks— 
five times more than Thailand and equally as many as Great Britain— 
into battle. In addition, the North Vietnamese could use more than 
1,000 American artillery pieces; $1 billion in facilities at American- 
built bases like Cam Ranh Bay; $2 to $3 billion in combat weaponry 
ranging from fighter bombers to rifles; $500 million in spare parts, 
engines, fuels and lubricants.^ 
By December 1975, eight months after the collapse of Saigon, 
the President's designs for Asia finally began to appear in public. 
Following a visit to China, and speaking in Honolulu on 7 December, the 
President proclaimed what he called a new Pacific Doctrine of "peace with 
all and hostility toward none." The President, speaking on the 34th 
anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, called for a foreign 
policy based upon military strength and friendly relations with Japan, 
the People's Republic of China and possibly Hanoi. He said: 
Let us join with the new and old countries of the Pacific 
in creating the greatest of civilizations on the shores 
of the greatest of oceans.-'-® 
The new alignment in foreign affairs and economic order conceived 
in 1970 with the Nixon Doctrine was becoming an embryo. President Ford, 
9
 lb id. 
^Philadelphia Inquirer, December 8, 1975, p. 1. 
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in hopes of building upon the foundation, listed six points in his Pacific 
Doctrine. The most important included: American strength was basic to 
any stable balance of power in the Pacific; the United States must 
normalize relations with China; outstanding political conflicts must be 
resolved; a structure of economic cooperation reflecting the aspirations 
of all the people of Asia and Southeast Asia must be created. 
The transition to a new Asian foreign policy was not totally with¬ 
out trauma for the American public. What appeared as a loss of Indochina, 
perhaps to some as a sellout to Communists, presented sticky political 
problems for the President. Publicly, both the President and the 
Secretary of State had to maintain an anti-communism stance. In addition, 
they felt compelled to chastise Congress for usurping Executive pre¬ 
rogatives in foreign affairs. In an interview shortly after the fall 
of Saigon, Kissinger said he doubted Hanoi would have staged it successful 
military drive on Saigon had Watergate not sapped presidential power 
and had Congress not enacted the War Powers Act. He said: 
In January '73 we did not foresee that Watergate would 
sap the Executive authority of the United States to 
such a degree that flexibility of Executive action 
inherently would be circumscribed."'"^ 
He also said that he had not foreseen that Congress would pass a law 
prohibiting the President from enforcing the Paris Agreement of 1973. 
He added, "And while the United States may not have done anything anyway. 
•^Ibid. 
12Honolulu Star Bulletin, May 5, 1975, p. A-10. 
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it made a lot of difference for Hanoi whether it thinks the United States 
probably will not or whether it thinks that we certainly cannot."-'-^ Per¬ 
sonally, the loss of Indochina to Kissinger may not have been as dis¬ 
tasteful as the usurpation by Congress of the President's power in the 
field of foreign affairs. 
President Ford, leader of the nation's morals and morale, also 
had a difficult task. The President realized he had the responsibility 
for soothing Americans concerning the Vietnam disaster, and scolding 
them for interfering in presidential affairs and persuading them not to 
want to revert to isolationism. In a speech at Tulane University on 
23 April 1975 he told a group, "These events, tragic as they are, portend 
neither the end of the world nor of American's leadership in the world. 
Although the Vietnam War did not end as gracefully as the President 
wanted, Ford believed that the nation came out of Vietnam with the "Best 
solution possible under the most difficult circumstances."^ However, 
the President warned Americans in an interview that in the case of South 
Vietnam and Cambodia that if he had had the opportunity to have made 
military assistance available, there might have been another ending to 
the situation. 
While the President faced the difficult task of assuring other 
American allies that the United States would not abandon them, he also 
had to turn American public opinion away from the isolationist path. 
l^IbicL 
l^Time, May 5, 1975, p. 20. 
-'New York Times, July 25, 1975, p. 10. 
In his efforts to do this, Ford rationalized the Vietnam experience by 
claiming that the nation had learned several lessons that it could apply 
to foreign affairs in the future. He said that despite Vietnam the 
nation still had to work with other governments that felt as the United 
States did. However, he added: 
We cannot... fight their battles for them. Those countries 
who believe in freedom as we do must carry the burden. 
We can help them, not with U.S. military personnel, but 
with arms and economic aid so that they can protect 
their own national interests and protect the freedom of 
their citizens. 
This task proved more difficult than the President expected. In June 197 5 
a poll conducted by Time magazine showed that only one-third of Americans 
believed it more important than ever to live up to American commitments 
to send military equipment and aid, but not troops, to Israel in case 
of aggression.^ A Harris poll released on 19 June showed only slight 
difference. Because of the American experience in Vietnam, a 43 to 27 
per cent plurality of Americans favored using American troops, air power 
and naval power to defend South Korea if Communist North Korea invaded 
18 it. 
The Domestic Side 
Public opinion played no less of a role in domestic matters than 
in foreign affairs. Many of the constraints public opinion had placed 
16philadelphia Inquirer, June 13, 1975, p. A-10. 
17xime, June 16, 1975. However, only 19 per cent thought that a 
lack of commitment by the American people was to blame for the fall of 
Indochina. 
ISwashington Post, June 19, 1975. 
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upon the President in foreign affairs also were present in the refugee 
resettlement program. Anti-refugee public opinion proved a potential 
political powder keg with which the President and his agents had to 
contend. 
Much of the anti-involvement attitude of the American public 
emerged again when the President announced his plan to bring some 
130,000 refugees into the United States. As a result, politicians had 
to weigh the public reaction as the President, State Department and 
Defense Department started formulating plans to deal with refugees. 
In evacuation planning public opinion had forced the President to 
consider the impact, especially the political effect, that as many as 
1.5 million refugees could have on the nation's depressed economy. In 
this regard, fears that refugees would take jobs away from Americans 
and add to the^nation's social problems greatly limited the President's 
options. Because of these domestic considerations, it appears Washington 
officials delayed planning for evacuation of refugees until the last 
minute. As a result, the number of refugees evacuated was about two- 
thirds less than it should have been. 
Public opinion greatly influenced other government departments 
and political factions. Anti-refugee reactions limited the Defense 
Department in its plans to establish refugee camps throughout the nation 
and forced it to establish camps in areas of the nation that looked 
the most receptive. Also, to state and federal politicians the refugees 
and the resettlement program, for a time, looked like a touchy political 
problem. Those politicians who did not benefit from the program 
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criticized it; those who did praised it. Even a politically conscious 
faction or reservists within the Army attempted to use the refugees to 
their advantage. The group, acting as agents for a larger group of 
7,000 attempted to use the program to intimidate the Pentagon into 
keeping what appeared as an obsolete Army program. 
In short, the role public opinion played in the events associated 
with Vietnam and the refugees was significant. The American public, 
if only for a short period, made it known that it had a say in both 
domestic and foreign affairs. For the most part, its tool was simply 
the public opinion poll. 
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